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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Purpose of the Research
UDICIAL selection has been the subject of a long-standing debate both
in Texas and in other states. Much of that debate is emotionally
charged or based on personal experiences. The purpose of this paper is
to offer an empirical analysis of the present system of judicial selection in
Texas. The paper will explore what is actually happening within the Texas
system and, where appropriate, will draw comparisons and contrasts with
studies of other systems of selection in other states.
Prior to exploring Texas' court structure and contemporary Texas judicial
selection, a brief overview of the state's past experiences with judicial selec-
tion will be offered. A short discussion of the major systems of judicial selec-
tion will then be presented. In this way, a context will be provided for the
analysis of Texas' system.
SELECTION IN TEXAS
B. Overview of the Texas Experience
A diagram of the structure of the Texas judicial system is presented in
Figure 1. This paper will be primarily concerned with the district courts, the
courts of appeals, and the two statewide courts, especially the Texas
Supreme Court.
The Texas Constitution provides for the election of most of the state's
judges. However, the governor appoints district and appellate judges to va-
cant positions. County courts at law judges and justices of the peace are also
elected; vacant positions are filled through appointment by the county com-
missioners' court. Municipal judges may either be appointed or elected de-
pending on the city charter or ordinance.'
Judges were not always elected officials in Texas. When Texas first be-
came a state, judges were appointed by the governor with consent of the
Texas Senate. Five years later, in 1850, the influence of Jacksonian Democ-
racy led to the introduction of judicial elections in Texas.2
During Reconstruction, gubernatorial appointment of judges was rein-
stated. The Reconstruction Constitution of 1869 was replaced in 1876 by
the current Texas Constitution, which requires election of judges. The 1876
Constitution greatly limited the powers of the governor and was a reaction
to the powers exercised by Governor E.J. Davis under the 1869 Constitu-
tion.3 Under the 1869 Constitution, not only did the governor have the
power to appoint judges, but he also appointed mayors, district attorneys,
public weighers, and city aldermen. This appointment power was so exten-
sive that it included 10,000 state officials.4
Since early in this century, the popularity of partisan election of judges
has waned outside of the South.5 Since the South was until recently a one-
party Democratic region, partisan election meant that competition for judi-
cial offices, if it occurred at all, occurred within the Democratic Party. In-
creasingly, Texas, along with much of the South, is experiencing the growth
of the Republican Party. Along with that growth comes competition for
judicial offices during the regular election.
The debate over the desirability of retaining the current system of judicial
selection in Texas, however, precedes the growth of the Republican Party in
the state. Proposals for constitutional amendments to change the system of
selection have been made frequently. 6 In 1974 the Constitutional Revision
Commission offered two judicial selection proposals: one for a system based
1. A detailed discussion of Texas' court system is found in TEXAS JUDICIAL COUNCIL
AND OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION, TEXAS JUDICIAL SYSTEM: ANNUAL REPORT,
1983, at 16-30 (1984) [hereinafter cited as ANNUAL REPORT]. Texas judicial selection proce-
dures are detailed in L. BERKSON, S. BELLER & M. GRIMALDI, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE
UNITED STATES: A COMPENDIUM OF PROVISIONS 159-163 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
COMPENDIUM].
2. Douglas, Selection and Discipline of State Judges in Texas, 14 Hous. L. REV. 672, 676
(1977).
3. Id. at 677.
4. T. FEHRENBACH, LONE STAR: A HISTORY OF TEXAS 417 (1968).
5. COMPENDIUM, supra note 1, at 3-4, 14.
6. Dickson, Perspectives on Judicial Reform in Texas: View From the Bench, 2 PUB.
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FIGURE 1
COURT STRUCTURE OF TEXAS
January 1, 1985
SUPREME COURT COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(I Court ( 9 Justices) (I Court - 9 Judges)
Jurisdiction: Jurisdiction:
Final Ippellate jurisdiction nFin l appellate jurisdiction in
in civil and juvenile casesj criminal cases.
CIVIL APPEALS CRIMINAL APPEALS C
COURT OF APPEAL R
(14 Courts - 79 Justices)
Jurisdiction; uIntermediate appeals from trial..




DISTRICT COURTS (357) CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURTS (10)
Jurisdiction: Jurisdiction:
Original jurisdiction in civil actions Same as other district courts, but to
over $500, divorce, title to land, give preference to criminal cases.
contested elections, and contested
probate matters.




COSITUTIONAL COUNTY COURTS (254) COUNTY COURTS AT LAW (121) PROBATE COURTS (11I)
Jurisdiction: Jurisdiction: Jurisdiction:
u nal jurisdiction in civil actions between * Limited jurisdiction over civil tdLimited probate$20and $1,000. matters, most under matters.
" Poate (contested matters transferred to $5,000.
District Court). - Limited jurisdiction over
* Exlsive original jurisdiction over criminal matters.
midmeanors with fine greater than $200 or 0 Appeals dle novo from lower
jail sentence (except where there is a Criminal courts.
District Court).
. Appeals dle novo from lower courts.
MUNICIPAL COURTS JUSTICE OF THE PEACE COURTS
(838 Courts - 1003 Judges) (968 Courts)
Jurisdiction: Jurisdiction:
* Criminal misdemeanors with fine 0 Civil actions under M50.
less than $200. - Small claims.
" Exclusive jurisdiction over municipal 0 Criminal misdemeanors with fine
ordinance violations less than $200.
- Preliminary hearings.
Source: Select Committee on The Judiciary, Final Report and Recommendations To The 69th Legislature (Austin: State of Texas,
undated), Appendix 1.
SELECTION IN TEXAS
on the Missouri plan and the other for nonpartisan election of judges. Those
proposals were rejected, and over the next four legislative sessions at least
fifteen unsuccessful proposals were offered favoring either the Missouri plan
or nonpartisan election. 7
The following section will explore the major systems of judicial selection.
An assessment will then be made of the current operation of the system of
partisan election of judges in Texas.
II. THE MAJOR SYSTEMS OF JUDICIAL SELECTION
A. The Variety of Ways Judges are Selected
There are numerous ways to select judges. So many methods of judicial
selection exist that hardly any two states have identical systems.8 Most
states have hybrid systems in which some judges will be chosen under one
method and judges at another level of the court system will be chosen by a
completely different method. Some states also have different methods for
filling vacancies than exist for selection at the beginning of a judicial term of
office.9
If a general classification scheme is developed for the methods of judicial
selection, it is possible to identify four major types of selection: (1) appoint-
ment; (2) commission selection; (3) nonpartisan election; and (4) partisan
election. Within each of these general categories are numerous variations.
For example, judges may be appointed by the governor, by the legislature, or
by sitting judges. 10
A state's choice of a system of judicial selection may be explained in large
part by historical trends. States that rely on appointive systems often contin-
ued that practice from their colonial or Revolutionary War practices. The
original thirteen states tend to stress appointive systems. Eastern and South-
ern states, the states most affected by the Jacksonian pressures for popular
reforms, continue to stress partisan election of judges. Nonpartisan elections
were adopted largely by those Western and Midwestern states that were just
entering the Union in the latter part of the nineteenth and early part of the
twentieth centuries. It was during this time period that Populist and Pro-
gressive movements were sweeping the country. Commission selection
gained support by stressing the professionalization of the judiciary and by
gaining the support of lawyers' professional associations. It is commission
selection that has slowly made inroads against all of the other systems of
judicial selection.I I
SERV. 1, 1 (Feb. 1975); Calvert, Selection of Judges, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL
SOCIETY OF TEXAS 19, 20-21 (1983).
7. SELECT COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL SELECTION, INTERIM REPORT TO THE 68TH
TEXAS LEGISLATURE 35 (1982); TEXAS CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION COMMISSION, A NEW
CONSTITUTION FOR TEXAS: TEXT, EXPLANATION, COMMENTARY 114-117 (1973).
8. COMPENDIUM, supra note 1, at 6.
9. Id. at 6, 49-179.
10. Id. at 3-7.
11. Flango & Ducat, What Difference Does Method of Judicial Selection Make? Selection
Procedures in State Courts of Last Resort 5 JUST. SyS. J. 25, 35-36 (1979).
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A discussion of all of the variations in selection mechanisms and their
strengths and weaknesses is beyond the scope of this research; however, the
remainder of this section will offer a brief assessment of the four major sys-
tems of judicial selection and some of the variations upon those systems.
1. Appointment of Judges. As Table 1 shows, appointment is used for the
selection of all or most judges in seven states. It is also used for the selection
of all federal judges. Three states-Maine, New Jersey, and Rhode Island-
follow the national model in which the chief executive nominates and the
senate confirms a judicial candidate. Three states-Connecticut, South Car-
olina, and Virginia-have a system of legislative appointment to most
courts. In New Hampshire, a five member elected council confirms the gov-
ernor's nominee. 12
The advantage of the appointment process is, depending on one's ideol-
ogy, also its weakness. That is, the system promotes judicial independence
by having no substantial check on the judge after the confirmation process.
The judge's accountability to the public occurs only indirectly through the
electoral responsiveness of the appointing and confirming officers. 13 Judicial
accountability is a matter of degree. It is quite simply the extent to which
the people directly choose their judges. Obviously, for such a choice to be
meaningful, it must be an informed choice. Judicial independence is at the
opposite end of the continuum from judicial accountability. Judicial inde-
pendence is the extent to which the judiciary is removed from the voting
process. A system of judicial appointment maximizes judicial independence.
These definitions of accountability and independence exclude any ethical or
moral connotations that are sometimes associated with the two terms.
The characteristics of judicial appointees are determined by the ap-
pointing officer, who may be concerned with merit, friendship, party loyalty,
or ideological purity.14 At least for the United States Supreme Court, there
is some evidence that the appointment process has worked reasonably well in
selecting excellent judges. In June 1970, 65 law school deans and professors
of law, history, and political science evaluated the performance of 96 justices
who had served on the Supreme Court from 1789-1969. The classification
scheme is, of course, a highly subjective one; however, 12 justices were rated
"Great;" 15 "Near Great," 55 "Average," 6 "Below Average," and only 8
were rated as "Failures."1 5
In order to discourage emphasis on political concerns at the expense of
merit, the American Bar Association (ABA) has a standing committee that
rates federal judicial nominees as "well qualified," "qualified," or "not quali-
fied." The ratings are subjective evaluations based on the judicial candi-
date's reputation, age, health, legal experience, and temperament. The ABA
12. COMPENDIUM, supra note 1, at 6.
13. H. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 34-35 (1980).
14. For appointments to the U.S. Supreme Court see H. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRES-
IDENTS 54-63 (1974). For appointments to Texas courts see Henderson & Sinclair, The Selec-
tion of Judges in Texas, 5 Hous. L. REV. 430, 444-46 (1968).




























































I Classification is based upon the system of selection used for initial selection of the largest
number of judges within each state.
Source: L. BERKSON, S. BELLER, & M. GRIMALDI, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE UNITED
STATES: A COMPENDIUM OF PROVISIONS 6, 10, 14, 16 (1980).
has had some influence in the appointment process; however, a President can
successfully override most efforts to prevent the confirmation of a nominee
who is rated "not qualified."'16
It seems likely that presidents have a reasonably good notion of the ideolo-
gies of the people whom they appoint to the bench.17 The Reagan Adminis-
tration has made particularly strong efforts to discern the beliefs of
prospective judicial nominees by inquiring about the candidate's views on
pressing social issues. At least at the federal level, the appointment process
can be used by a chief executive to mold a political agenda.18
Perhaps the most innovative development in the appointment process in
recent years was the Carter plan for the selection of federal judges. Through
an executive order, President Carter established a series of advisory panels
that were collectively called the United States Circuit Judge Nominating
Commission. Senators were encouraged to establish similar commissions in
their states for the recruitment of federal district judges. The purpose of
these panels was to promote appointments based on merit and to enhance
the pool of eligible nominees, particularly the pool of minorities and
16. H. JACOB, JUSTICE IN AMERICA 105-07 (1978); J. GROSSMAN, LAWYERS AND
JUDGES: THE A.B.A. AND THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL SELECTION (1965).
17. H. ABRAHAM, supra note 14, at 61-63.
18. Goldman, Reagan's Judicial Appointments at Mid-Term: Shaping the Bench in His
Own Image, 66 JUDICATURE 344, 347 (1983); Choyke, Reagan Putting Conservative Stamp on





The panels have been criticized by some for their strong political makeup.
Though differences existed among the circuits, one scholar found that over-
all the circuit judge panels were weighted with Democrats, lawyers, and
Carter campaign workers. They have also been criticized for having unduly
rigid screening standards.20 Yet the panels have also been praised for
"bringing an element of substantial reform to a process characterized for
years by politics and patronage."'21
It is possible to compare some of the characteristics of the Carter plan
judges with traditionally appointed judges since not all senators used the
Carter plan for district judges. According to one scholar's research, based
upon a personal data questionnaire that was required from all judicial nomi-
nees prior to Judiciary Committee confirmation hearings, there was a ten-
dency for the Carter plan to produce more nonwhite and female judges than
the traditional appointment process. Nearly 40% of the Carter plan nomi-
nees were nonwhite and/or female compared to about 26% of the nominees
from the traditional process. There was no relationship between Carter plan
nominees and graduation from elite law schools or receipt of law school hon-
ors compared to traditional nominees. There was a tendency for Carter plan
nominees to be graduates of out-of-state law schools compared to traditional
nominees-35.2% compared to 18.2%. Perhaps these statistics suggest that
Carter plan appointees tended to be less parochial than traditional
appointees. 22
Research has found that panel nominees were just as likely as traditional
nominees to give speeches, get involved in political campaigns, and be candi-
dates for office. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, panel procedures did
not create a greater likelihood that nominees would be apolitical. 23
Additionally, research has shown that the legal practices of panel nomi-
nees and traditionally appointed nominees proved to be very similar. The
only difference in legal careers of panel versus traditional nominees was a
slight tendency for panel nominees to have greater involvement in criminal
and trial litigation.24
As one scholar has concluded, rather than dramatically changing the
types of people who are recruited to the federal bench, the strength of the
Carter plan was to open up the selection process to a much greater number
of potential nominees than would exist under the traditional appointment
system.25
19. Slotnick, Federal Appellate Judge Selection: Recruitment Changes and Unanswered
Questions, 6 JUST. Sys. J. 283, 284-85 (1981).
20. Slotnick, The U.S. Circuit Judge Nominating Commission, 1 L. & POL'Y Q. 465, 478-
80 (1979).
21. Wooten, Carter Establishes Merit Selection of Appellate Judges, But Yields to Senators
on District Courts, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1977, at 28A, col. 1.
22. Slotnick, Judicial Selection Systems and Nomination Outcomes: Does the Process
Make a Difference?, 12 AM. POL. Q. 225, 227, 229-31 (1984).
23. Id. at 232.
24. Id. at 234.
25. Id. at 237.
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2. Commission Selection. There are two basic kinds of commission selec-
tion plans. One is the Missouri plan, in which a commission composed of
lawyers, judges, and lay people prepares a list of possible judicial nominees
for the governor. The governor's appointee must be selected from the list.
After a period of time, often one year, the judge then runs for office in a
retention election. In such an election, the judge has no opponent. The vot-
ers are asked to vote "yes" or "no" on whether the judge should be retained
in office. If the judge is retained, the judge will serve a specified term before
facing another retention election. 26
The California plan is the second major type of commission selection sys-
tem. With the California plan, rather than preparing a list of prospective
judicial nominees, the Commission on Judicial Appointments has veto
power over the governor's nominee. 27 Compared to the Missouri plan, the
main criticism of the California plan is that it may be more difficult for a
commission to reject the choice of the governor than it would be to present
the governor with names from which a choice must be made. 28
Both types of commission plans check the appointment power of the gov-
ernor and reflect a compromise between the goals of selection of judges by
the public and independence from the voting process. Theoretically, judges
appointed under commission plans are not as subject to public opinion as
they would be if they were regular participants in partisan political contests.
Yet the retention election offers some degree of electoral accountability over
judges. It is also argued that partisan considerations are lessened by com-
mission selection and that the use of commission selection enhances the con-
cern for the appointment of able individuals to the bench.
Although commission selection has been adopted for the initial selection
of all or most judges in thirteen states, scholars have identified both
problems and possible problems with the operation of this system. As will
be noted in the section on the quality of judges, measurement of judicial
quality is a very subjective process that is not easily subject to empirical
study. However, one such subjective comparison of lawyers' ratings of Mis-
souri plan judges with partisan elected judges did find that the Missouri plan
lessened the likelihood of the most poorly rated judges being selected. On
the other hand, it did not produce the highest rated judges.29
Partisan considerations remain in the selection of judges under commis-
sion plans. An analysis of the first twenty-five years of the Missouri plan
showed that governors tended to appoint members of their own party. The
commission members, with the knowledge that the person would never be
appointed, often placed an opposing party member on their list of prospec-
tive nominees. It was also found that commission members would rig the
list of prospective nominees to achieve their political or personal goals. Ad-
ditionally, campaigns for lawyer members on the commission reflected deep-
26. COMPENDIUM, supra note 1, at 4-6; Douglas, supra note 2, at 683-87.
27. H. ABRAHAM, supra note 13, at 37.
28. Id.
29. R. WATSON & R. DOWNING, THE POLITICS OF THE BENCH AND BAR 283-84 (1969).
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rooted tensions between plaintiff and defense bars. Though the plaintiff's bar
fared reasonably well in getting its members on the commissions that are
responsible for trial judges, the commission for appellate selection tended to
have little representation from the plaintiff's bar.30
The retention election may promote electoral accountability; however,
this is open to question. Only one judge in Missouri's long experience with
the Missouri plan was defeated in a retention election.3' Nationwide, of all
retention elections in the election years of 1972, 1974, 1976, and 1978, 1.6%
of judges were not retained.3 2 This low percentage may indicate either over-
whelming satisfaction with the judges selected under the commission system,
or it may indicate that retention elections are little more than "rubber-
stamp" approvals of judges. A study of the 33 judges who were not retained
in the four election years from 1972-1978 suggests that, for most of those
judges, defeats did involve issues related to judicial merit. Questions of judi-
cial competence were involved in 13 of the races; debates over judicial phi-
losophy in 13; concerns over judicial conduct in 12 races and judicial
temperament in 11. Controversial decisions were issues in 6 races; criminal
activity by the judge in 5; and public scandals in 5. Matters relating to local
politics were involved in 4 races and miscellaneous issues in 7. The number
of issues adds up to more than 33 because most of the races involved more
than one issue. 33
The retention election offers some degree of judicial accountability to the
voters. For example, a slightly larger percentage of judges were defeated
nation-wide in retention elections in the 1970s than were defeated through
the election process in Texas in 1956. 34 However, the 1970s retention elec-
tion nation-wide led to a defeat rate for judges that was about one-third of
the defeat rate for judges in Texas in the period 1952-1962.35 That electoral
accountability is somewhat retained creates a possibility that special interest
groups will control low voter participation judicial elections and that judges
will become dependent on special interests for retention election campaign
funding.36
Rather than taking the "politics" out of judicial selection, the main
strength of the commission plan for the selection of judges is that it does
provide a check on the appointment power of a governor.
30. Id. at 101-198.
31. S. CARBON & L. BERKSON, JUDICIAL RETENTION ELECTIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES 23 (1980).
32. Id. at 21.
33. Id. at 26-27.
34. Henderson & Sinclair, supra note 14, at 441.
35. Id.
36. Voter participation in retention elections is low. In the first 25 years of the Missouri
plan, only one Missouri judge was not retained. That judge lost the retention election for a
variety of reasons, but those reasons included the opposition of a newspaper and a public
utility. See Watson, Judging the Judges, 53 JUDICATURE 283, 289 n.5, 290 (1970). Well or-
ganized New Right groups have been responsible for the strong attack on California Chief
Justice Rose Bird, and those groups may succeed in defeating her in a retention election. See
Jenkins, The Trouble with Rose Bird, TWA AMBASSADOR, Nov. 1985, at 68 passim.
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3. Nonpartisan Election. Nonpartisan elections reflect a somewhat differ-
ent compromise between the goals of independence from the voting process
and electoral accountability than does commission selection. Theoretically,
nonpartisan elections remove judicial elections from party politics, thus al-
lowing candidates to be other than party loyalists or bound to party factions.
Ideally, ballots in nonpartisan elections are cast on the basis of candidate
merit rather than on the basis of party affiliation. A nonpartisan ballot
would avoid candidates being elected or defeated because of straight party
voting or because of the popularity of the candidate at the top of the party
ticket. In some states, nonpartisan judicial elections are scheduled in off-
years to further reduce the danger that party politics will influence judicial
election outcomes.
37
Nonpartisan elections are often more partisan than they are purported to
be. This problem with nonpartisan elections is illustrated by Ohio. Judicial
elections in Ohio are nonpartisan; however, the candidates in the election
run in the party primaries. The results of this system are similar to the party
involvement that one finds in partisan elections. In some states, parties sup-
port candidates even though the judicial candidates do not run under a party
label. 38
Where campaigns more closely reflect the goal of nonpartisanship, voters
can face a dearth of information about the candidates since the candidates
cannot rely on the party and party workers to inform voters. Absent the
party label, candidates may have to expend large sums in order to reach
voters. Therefore, nonpartisan campaigns can become very expensive. 39 If
one believes that high voter turnout is desirable for elections, nonpartisan
elections create still another problem. It has been shown that the greater the
effort to remove judicial candidates from partisan politics, the smaller the
extent of voter participation. One study, for example, found that off-year
elections produced dramatically lower voter turnout than regular election
year turnout.4°
Like commission selection, it goes too far to claim that nonpartisan selec-
tion takes the politics out of judicial selection; however, it does make the
party affiliation of the judge a less important determinant of the election
outcome. Studies of nonpartisan selection of judges in Oregon and Washing-
ton suggest that, with such materials as a state-published voter's guide
mailed to every voter in the state, it is possible for voters to be informed at
least where the nonpartisan elections are in relatively small judicial
37. P. DuBoIs, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH: JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND THE QUEST FOR
ACCOUNTABILITY 41 (1980).
38. Adamany and Dubois provide two examples of nonpartisan judicial elections with
strong partisan overtones. Even Wisconsin, described by Adamany and Dubois as "a truly
nonpartisan system," had clearly identifiable Republican and Democratic candidates pitted
against one another in three of eight supreme court elections in the 1960s. Adamany & Du-
bois, Electing State Judges, 1976 WIs. L. REV. 731, 757, 760.
39. M. Kidd, Remarks Delivered by President, Mack Kidd, at the Texas Trial Lawyers
Board Meeting in Houston, Texas.




4. Partisan Election. The partisan election of judges is used in thirteen
states for the initial selection of all or most of those states' judges. Partisan
election of judges developed under the influence of Jacksonian Democracy,
and, at one time, it was the most prominant system of judicial selection. At
the beginning of the Civil War, for example, 24 of the 34 states provided for
the election of judges. Partisan election began to decline in popularity dur-
ing the last third of the nineteenth century when there was an increasing
dissatisfaction with the influence of political machines in the selection of
judges. 42
What is perceived to be the major strength of partisan election of judges to
some is, to others, its greatest weakness. Partisan election subjects judges to
the electoral process. Proponents of partisan elections argue that judges
should be subject to the ballot since that insures that judges will be accounta-
ble to the people. The opponents of partisan election argue that judges
should not represent a constituency, but should instead be independent of
the popular will. Additionally, opponents of the plan suggest that, even if it
is agreed that electoral accountability is a desirable goal, voters lack suffi-
cient knowledge of or interest in judicial elections to hold judges accounta-
ble. In contrast, the proponents of partisan judicial selection argue that
political party affiliation provides an important cue to voters who may not
have great awareness of the judicial candidates. Party affiliation, it is ar-
gued, can provide information about candidates that allows voters reason-
ably to support or oppose candidates. 43
The bulk of the remainder of the paper will concern this last form of judi-
cial selection, the partisan election of judges. Although the issue of selection
of judges by the public versus independence from the voting process is a
subjective area and cannot be indisputably documented in this or any empiri-
cal study, the research can shed light on how partisan election of judges is
working in Texas. It can also assess the degree to which the current system
achieves the goal of judicial accountability to the public. Before discussing
judicial selection in Texas, however, the question of differences in judicial
decisions across the systems of selection should be addressed.
B. Comparisons of Judicial Decisions by Judges Selected Under the
Various Systems
One study examined the decisions of the fifty state supreme courts and
found no significant relationships between the system of judicial selection
and the success of various categories of appellants. 4 Another study com-
41. Sheldon & Lovich, Knowledge and Judicial Voting: The Oregon and Washington Ex-
perience, 67 JUDICATURE 235 passim (1983).
42. COMPENDIUM, supra note 1, at 3-4.
43. A good overview of this debate is presented in Adamany & Dubois, supra note 38, at
731-78.
44. Atkins & Glick, Formal Judicial Recruitment and State Supreme Court Decisions, 2
AM. POL. Q. 427 passim (1974).
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pared elected and appointed state supreme court justices. Although differ-
ences in the success of several categories of litigants were found, those
differences were not significant.45
In 1934 California changed its system for selecting its appellate bench.
The change was from popular election to the California plan. A study of the
effects of that change indicated that there were few differences between the
decisions of judges who served under an elective system and the decisions of
judges who were selected after 1934 under the California plan. Overall,
prior to 1934, 48% of the California Supreme Court's cases were decided in
a "liberal" direction; after 1934, 47% of the Court's cases were decided in a
"liberal" direction. 46
One study, however, has suggested that different judicial selection systems
produce different outcomes. The study compared judicial sentencing deci-
sions and willingness to grant probation in Pittsburgh and in Minneapolis.
Pittsburgh has a system of partisan election of judges; Minneapolis has non-
partisan election of judges. The Minneapolis judges were more likely both to
impose lengthy sentences and to deny probation than were the Pittsburgh
judges. The difference in decisions was ascribed to differences in the per-
sonal characteristics of the judges. Pittsburgh judges were more likely to
come from families of modest incomes and to be from ethnic and religious
minority groups; Minneapolis judges were more likely to have middle class,
Northern European, white, Protestant origins. The author suggested that
the partisan elective system produced judges with the Pittsburgh judges'
characteristics; the Minneapolis judges were produced by a nonpartisan sys-
tem. The study is of two cities only, and there may be cultural differences
between the two cities that explain the differences found; however, it is the
major study that points to judicial selection systems to explain significant
differences in outcomes of cases.47
Section VI, on the quality of judges, will discuss the limited and inconclu-
sive evidence that points to differences in the characteristics and quality of
judges selected under the various systems of selection. The next section,
however, will examine the Texas system of selection.
III. JUDICIAL SELECTION IN TEXAS
A. Appointments to the Bench
Though Texas has a system of partisan election for the selection of judges,
the governor appoints district court and higher level judges to fill vacant
judicial posts. The result is that judges in Texas have tended to obtain their
judicial seats initially through appointment. Table 2 examines the years
1962 and 1984 to illustrate the significance of appointment as a method of
judicial selection in Texas. In 1962, 57% of trial court judges initially ob-
45. S. NAGEL, IMPROVING THE LEGAL PROCESS 202-03 (1975).
46. Schneider & Maughan, Does the Appointment of Judges Lead to a More Conservative
Bench? The Case of California, 5 JUST. Sys. J. 45, 47, 51 (1979).
47. Levin, Urban Politics and Judicial Behavior, I J. LEGAL STUD. 193 passim (1972).
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tained their positions through appointment, and 67% did so in 1984. Fifty
percent of appellate court judges initially obtained their positions through
appointment in 1962, and 51% did so in 1984. During the period 1940-
1962, 66% of all judges obtained their positions through appointment. In
1984, 63% of all judges were initially appointed to their positions.
Table 2
Percentage of Judges Obtaining Their Position Initially Through
Appointment
TRIAL COURTS' APPELLATE COURTS2
1962 57% 50%
19843 67% 51%
11962 Trial Courts = State District Courts; 1984 Trial Courts = State District Courts and
Criminal District Courts.
2Appellate Courts = Supreme Court; Court of Criminal Appeals; Courts of Appeal.
3 Information is as of October 15, 1984.
Sources: Henderson & Sinclair, The Selection of Judges in Texas, 5 Hous. L. REV. 430, 442
(1968); TEXAS JUDICIAL COUNCIL AND OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION,
ANNUAL REPORT 64 (1984).
Appointed judges have the advantage of incumbency in the party primary
and in the general election.48 When Texas was a one party state, the ap-
pointed judges were fairly secure after appointment. The likelihood of defeat
in the general election was nonexistent, and the likelihood of defeat in the
Democratic Party primary was only four percent. Only 13.8% of judges
were opposed in the first primary following appointment. Once a judge
cleared the hurdle of initial election, the chances of defeat in the Democratic
Party primary became even more miniscule.4 9
In 1978 Texas elected its first Republican governor since Reconstruction.
The effect of William Clements' election was to reshape the politics of judi-
cial appointment. As a Republican governor, he tended to appoint Republi-
cans to the bench. However, it was quickly discovered that Republican
appointees in traditionally Democratic areas faced far greater electoral risks
than did previously appointed judges. Every one of the 23 incumbent judges
who was defeated in 1982 was a Clements appointee who was facing the first
election after appointment. In 1982 a Democrat, Mark White, was elected
governor. His Democratic appointees have experienced electoral uncer-
tainty in the increasingly Republican areas, especially in and near Dallas and
Harris counties. Of the 16 incumbent judges who were defeated in 1984, all
were Democrats, and 10 were Governor White's appointees who were facing
that crucial first election after appointment. 50 These findings suggest that
48. Henderson & Sinclair, supra note 14, at 442.
49. Id. at 441-42.
50. Calculated from election statistics available from the Texas Secretary of State; ap-
pointment files in the Secretary of State's office; and appointment information found in AN-
NUAL REPORT, supra note 1, and earlier reports published in 1981, 1982, and 1983. That
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defeated incumbent judges tend to be those in early stages of their judicial
careers. It is after having been appointed that incumbent Texas judges are
most politically vulnerable.
B. Judicial Elections
1. Party Primaries. Judges face the greatest electoral risk in the first elec-
tion after appointment; however, they must be subject to a party primary
prior to that election. According to the data, there is only a low risk of
defeat in the party primary. Table 3 presents data on the 1956 Democratic
primary, combines data on Democratic primaries from 1940-1962, and com-
pares those figures with the 1980, 1982, and 1984 primaries. The table
clearly shows that defeat of incumbents, or even a challenge to incumbents
in the primaries, is a rarity. As was the case when Texas was a one party
state, often only one candidate seeks nomination for a judicial post even
when there is no incumbent. 51
2. Increased General Election Challenges and Incumbent Defeats. A ma-
jor change in recent years, and the quality that makes the Texas system of
judicial selection vastly different from earlier periods, is the competitiveness
of the political parties in judicial elections. In 1968 two University of Hous-
ton professors, Bancroft Henderson and T.C. Sinclair, surveyed lawyers and
judges in Texas. The survey tried to determine which factors would "always
disqualify" a person for the bench. Having an "unsuccessful law practice"
was the major disqualifying factor, followed closely by being "known as a
Republican." Other disqualifying factors, including being a liberal, lacking
political activity, being partisan, being a plaintiff's lawyer, and being a big
firm lawyer, ranked far lower in the minds of Texas lawyers and judges. 52
In 1978 the Republican Party began mounting numerous challenges for
judicial posts. Table 4 notes that, from the 1978 election through the 1984
election, between 26% and 38% of appellate court races were contested.
Between 14% and 26% of district court races were contested. The number
of challenges and the strength of the Republican Party in the state was a new
force in state politics. At the judicial level in 1978, the Republican Party
threat was a cause for concern among Democratic incumbents, but the suc-
cess of the Republican effort to defeat Democratic incumbents was exceed-
ingly limited. Though some incumbents may have chosen not to run to
avoid possible defeat at the polls, only three incumbent judges were de-
feated--one at the district level and two at the appellate level. All of these
judges were in the Dallas County area.53
newly appointed judges have a higher risk of defeat than do previously elected judges has been
noted by Bush & Coffee, The Partisan System and the Search for Alternatives, 45 TEX. B.J.
1511, 1512 (1982) and Armstrong, Problems ofJudicial Recruitment, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY OF TEXAS 33, 35 (1983).
51. Henderson & Sinclair, supra note 14, at 442.
52. Id. at 468.
53. For a discussion of this first major show of Republican strength in Texas judicial
races, see Blow, GOP Comes Up All Smiles After Judgeship Victories, Dallas Morning News,
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'Total Judicial Elections is the sum of Appellate Court Elections and District Court Elections.
2Appellate Courts are the Texas Supreme Court, Court of Criminal Appeals, and Courts of
Appeal.
3 District Courts are State District Courts and Criminal District Courts.
Sources: 1978 data are from, TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPORT OF THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL SELECTION, 67TH LEGISLATURE 101 (1982).
Election return data available at the office of the Texas Secretary of State indicates
some inaccuracies in the Select Committee's 1980 and 1982 data. While the
differences do not change the overall implications of the Table, I have used my
calculations based on the data from the Secretary of State's office for 1980 and 1982.
Data for 1984 were obtained from the Texas Office of Court Administration. The
Select Committee Report shows 164 judicial elections in 1980 in which 29% of the
candidates were opposed: 36% of 132 district judges and 38% of 32 appeals judges
were opposed. In 1982 the Report shows 34% of 271 judges opposed: 30% of 218
district judges and 47% of 53 appellate judges.
With a Republican governor and the strong role that gubernatorial ap-
pointment plays in the judicial selection system, it was possible to appoint
Republican judges. Additionally, with the pattern of Texas' support for Re-
publican Presidential candidates and a tendency for a strong candidate at the
top of the ticket to have a coattail effect on the rest of the ticket, the judicial
elections of 1980 became quite competitive.54 Table 5 notes, for example,
that 10 incumbent district judges and 4 appellate judges were defeated in
1980. Table 6 notes that 4 of 13 Democratic incumbents were defeated in
1980, as were 10 of 19 Republican judges. Of the 7 contested seats in which
no incumbent was running, 4 were won by Democrats. What is important to
note is that Republicans were able to win elections in Texas and to maintain
47% of their challenged appointed judges while defeating 31% of the Demo-
cratic incumbent judges whom they challenged. In contested races in which
the Democrats did not have the advantage of incumbency, Republicans won
43% of election contests.
In 1980 it should be recalled that Republican strength was aided by the
strong showing of Ronald Reagan in his race against Jimmy Carter. In 1980
54. The effect of coattails on judicial elections is well treated in Tomsho, The Judges Who
















Sources: Henderson & Sinclair, The Selection of Judges in Texas, 5 Hous. L. REV. 430, 441
n. 20, (1968); Texas Secretary of State; and Texas Office of Court Administration.
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(9 of 13 elections)
47%
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41%
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65%








(4 of 20 elections)
100%
(5 of 5 elections)
10%
(1 of 10 elections)
64.1%
(Ronald Reagan)
Sources: Texas Secretary of State and Texas Office of Court Administration.
Reagan garnered 57.2% of Texas' two-party presidential vote, thus provid-
ing a strong boost for Republican judicial candidates. In 1982 the Republi-
cans did not have the advantage of Ronald Reagan. Instead, they were faced
with the problem of a close race between Republican Governor Bill Cle-
ments and his Democratic opponent Mark White-a race that White won
with 53.7% of the two-party vote. Additionally, at the top of the ticket was
a race between a very strong incumbent Democratic senator, Lloyd Bentsen,
and his lesser known Republican opponent, Dallas area congressman Jim
Collins. Bentsen won 59.1% of the two-party vote. This time there seemed
to be a coattail effect benefiting Democrats. Lower on the ticket the Repub-
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lican challenges were weak or nonexistent, while the Democratic candidate
for lieutenant governor, Bill Hobby, was strong enough that he could have
produced a coattail effect for Democratic candidates listed below him on the
ballot. Hobby won 59% of the two-party vote. All 15 Democrats who were
incumbents running for re-election in a contested election won. Only 16
Republican judges in 39 contested elections won. Where there were con-
tested elections and no incumbents, the Democrats improved their margin of
victory by 8 percentage points over 1980 and won in 65% of the elections.
Contrary to 1982, 1984 was a banner year for Republicans in Texas. Ron-
ald Reagan's percentage of the two-party vote was an astounding 64.1% and
that margin of victory had tremendous impact further down the ticket. Four
of the 20 Democratic incumbents were reelected. Additionally, where there
was a contested election and no incumbent, only one out of 10 Democrats
won. Without campaigning, one Republican candidate for district judge in
Harris County won office in 1984 even though the campaign and election
were held while she was in Europe. Her Democratic incumbent opponent
campaigned, spent $40,000-$50,000, and was defeated by 30,000 votes. 55
What appears to have developed in Texas judicial elections is that in non-
presidential election years, Democratic candidates are likely to win; how-
ever, Democratic losses occur when voting for the national Republican
ticket impacts voting for Democratic candidates for state office. That pat-
tern is striking in Harris County, as Table 7 points out. In Dallas County
the picture is most dim for Democrats in presidential election years. Over-
all, Republicans gained momentum in 1980, did less well without President
Reagan's coattails in 1982, and crushed the Democrats in judicial elections
in 1984.
3. Straight Party Voting and its Effect on Judicial Elections. After the
1984 elections, Lance Tarrance determined that 25% of the voters cast a
straight Democratic Party ticket, and 22% cast a straight Republican
ticket. 56 While the difference in percentage points is not great, that differ-
ence does provide Democratic judicial candidates in state elections with a
slight advantage over Republican judicial candidates. To illustrate the im-
portance of even a three percentage point advantage in straight party voting,
the 1984 race for Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme Court can be examined.
The Democratic candidate, John Hill, received 54.2% of the vote or
2,733,318 votes. His opponent, Republican candidate John Bates, received
45.8% or 2,309,293 votes. The straight party vote accounted for almost
1,261,000 of Hill's votes and about 1,109,000 of Bates' votes. If the straight
party vote had been turned the other way, with 25% of the voters casting a
straight Republican ticket and 22% voting a straight Democratic ticket,
Bates would have gotten over 150,000 more votes and Hill over 150,000
fewer. Hill would have won a very close election with a margin of about
55. S. Stevens, The Selection of Judges As a Political Process 8 (Dec. 12, 1985) (unpub-
lished manuscript).
56. See infra text Table 8.
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120,000 votes instead of slightly over 424,000. If there had been a five per-
cent difference in straight party voting in favor of the Republicans, Bates
would have won the election. That five percent difference is only one per-
cent more than the actual difference in straight party voting in Harris
County. It is five percent less than the actual difference in straight party
voting in Dallas County.
Table 8 shows that the pattern of straight party voting is not uniform
throughout the state. Far more voters in Dallas County cast a straight Re-
publican ticket than cast a straight Democratic ticket. In Harris County as
well, Republican straight party voting was higher than was Democratic
straight party voting. Republican straight party voting in both Dallas, and
Harris County was greater in 1984 than in 1982. Democratic straight party
voting in Dallas and Harris counties was far lower in 1984 than it was in
1982.
Table 8
Straight Party Voting1 in Texas
(1982-1984)
Dem. 1982 Rep. Dem. 1984 Rep.
Statewide - - 25% 22%
Dallas County 30% 29% 21% 31%
Harris County 30% 18% 24% 28%
'Party Voting as a Percentage of Total Votes Cast.
Source: Calculated From: V. Tarrance, The Rise of the Straight Ticket Voter 7-9 (c. 1985).
The effect of straight party voting on candidate success can be considera-
ble when the disparity between the straight party vote for the two parties
widens. Table 9 shows that the difference in straight party voting between
the two parties forces the minority party candidate aggressively to pursue
independent voters. A particularly strong straight party vote in favor of one
party can make it almost impossible for a judicial candidate to make up the
difference with independent voters. For example, in Dallas County in 1984 a
Democratic judicial candidate would have had to capture 60.6% of the in-
dependent voters in order to win election by a margin of 50.1%. On the
other hand, for a Republican judicial candidate to win, one would have only
to gain the votes of 39.8% of the independent voters. Even in Harris
County, Democratic judicial candidates in 1984 needed 54.4% of the in-
dependent voters to win. A Republican in Harris County needed only 46%
of independent voters to win.
If a Democratic judicial candidate had run in the non-presidential cam-
paign year of 1982, chances of victory would have been far greater. In Har-
ris County, Democratic judicial candidates would have needed only 38.7%
of the independent voters to win, compared to an almost unattainable Re-
publican need for 61.7% of the independent voters. In Dallas County, the
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needing 49% of the independent voters and Republican candidates needing
51.5%.
Voters are not limited to voting for a straight party ticket or voting totally
independent, however. Many voters will split-ticket vote, but will lean
strongly toward one party. Party affiliation should be particularly influential
when low interest elections, such as judicial elections, are involved. 57 The
Lance Tarrance data, which is examined above, does not examine these
strong party identifiers among split-ticket voters. However, the Texas Poll
in 1984 does provide information on these voters that indicates how impor-
tant political party affiliation can be in judicial elections. The Texas Poll
measures persons' responses to questions rather than their actual voting be-
havior as the Lance Tarrance data did. Additionally, the sample of respon-
dents is too small to break down into areas within the state. The poll,
compared to the Lance Tarrance data, overestimates straight Republican
voting and underestimates straight Democratic voting. With these cautions
in mind, however, 16% of the poll respondents stated that although they did
not vote a straight ticket, they voted "mostly Republican." Ten percent
voted "mostly Democratic." Only 17% of the Texas Poll respondents
claimed to vote without leaning toward one party or the other.58 The body
of fully independent voters that would be most open to campaign efforts by
judicial candidates is quite small.
4. "Close" vs. "Landslide" Elections. Table 10 examines the degree of
competitiveness in judicial elections over the past three election cycles.
Political scientists have classified elections as "landslide" and "close" elec-
tions. "Landslide" elections are those in which there is a clear choice by the
voters. "Close" elections are those separated by only a relatively small per-
centage of votes and in which the elections could reasonably be assumed to
have gone either way. As a rule of thumb, political scientists have defined
"close" elections as those in which the victory margin is five percent or less.
"Landslide" elections are those in which the victory margin is over five per-
cent.3 9 Using this definition, nearly three-fifths of appellate court elections
and two-thirds of district court elections were "close." Such a large number
of "close" judicial elections means that either a small increase in straight
party voting for one party, mostly straight party voting for one party, or a
good coattail effect can create victory for candidates.
It should be noted that the bulk of judicial contests since 1980 have been
very fickle affairs in which anyone could win depending on the year in which
the candidate runs, the popularity of the candidate at the top of the ticket, or
the propensity of voters to vote straight party tickets.
5. Location of Incumbent Defeats. Contested judicial elections have been
57. Adamany & Dubois, supra note 38, at 775.
58. Telephone interview with James Dyer, Director of the Texas Poll, Texas A & M Uni-
versity (October 9, 1985).
59. M. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT 7
(1977).
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Table 10
Landslide vs. Close Judicial Elections
Landslide' Close
Appeal District Appeal District
Rep. 2 Dem. 3  Total Rep. Dem. Total Rep. Dem. Total Rep. Dem. Total
1980 0 1 = 1 3 64 = 9 2 6 = 8 11 10 = 21
1982 0 7 = 7 4 11 = 15 2 7 = 9 16 24 = 40
1984 5 0 = 5 11 3 = 14 2 2 = 4 12 0 = 12
Party
Totals 5 8 18 20 6 15 39 34
Total
Judges 13 38 21 73
ILandslide elections are those where the margin of victory is greater than 5%. Close elections are those with less
than a 5% margin of victory.
2Rep. =Victorious Republican judicial candidates.
3Dem. = Victorious Democratic judicial candidates.
4 Includes one Democratic judicial candidate who defeated a Republican appointed judge who ran as a write-in
candidate.
Sources: Election data from the Texas Secretary of State and Texas Office of Court Administration.
frequent since 1978. In regular elections, defeats of incumbent judges have
moved from being nonexistent to a 1980-1984 average of 12 per election for
district judges and 6 per election for appellate judges. Yet, only a few coun-
ties in Texas have actually experienced a contested district court judicial
election in which an incumbent was defeated. Figure 2 shows the counties in
which at least one district judge was defeated in 1980, 1982, or 1984. There
are 254 counties in Texas. As of January 1, 1985, there were 367 district
courts. Yet, during three election cycles, only 13 counties experienced
defeats of incumbent district judges. Four of those counties were in two-
county judicial districts. Most of those counties defeated one or two newly
appointed Republican district judges in 1982. Nine of the counties that de-
feated incumbents are among the twenty most densely populated in the state,
and six (Dallas, Harris, Tarrant, Bexar, Galveston, and El Paso counties) are
the six most densely populated counties. 6°
Only half of the courts of appeals in Texas have had incumbents defeated.
As Table 11 notes, the courts of appeals in which incumbents have been
most frequently defeated have been the two courts in Houston and the court
in Dallas. Eleven of the seventeen defeated courts of appeals judges have
been from those three courts.
Dallas and Harris counties are the two most densely populated in Texas
and are also by far the most likely to defeat incumbent judges. Such a pat-
tern should not be surprising. Urban areas are often less politically stable
than more rural areas and are inclined to reject historically established pat-
terns, such as Democratic Party voting or voting for incumbent judges.6 1
60. DALLAS MORNING NEWS, THE TEXAS ALMANAC: 1984-1985, at 340 (1983).
61. Glenn Robinson describes the state's new urban politics in this way: "Important de-
velopments in Texas politics have accompanied the dramatic transformations of the state's
major cities into sprawling, economically dynamic, self-sustaining conurbations. What were
once regional commercial centers dependent on the economy of the rural hinterland are today
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FIGURE 2
Counties in which at least one
Incumbent District Judge was
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Sources: Texas Secretary of State and
Texas Office of Court Administration
Indeed, in the high migration areas of Dallas and Harris counties, it is diffi-
cult, if not impossible, for significant numbers of voters to know the incum-
bents. In rural areas, it is probable that voters have some knowledge of
judges, if not a long-standing familiarity with them or their families. The
number of voters in some rural districts is small enough that a judge can
meet most voters in the county over a term. In fact, it would be possible to
meet them several times merely by being active in religious organizations,
being a club member, making oneself available for speeches and banquets,
and attending weddings, funerals, and homecomings. 62
international centers of high technology, fashion, services, and culture. The accompanying
sophistication of residents has generated in turn new expectations and demands." G. Robin-
son, Democracy in Texas: The Mobilization of the Texas Electorate 25 (Sept., 1984) (unpub-
lished manuscript).
62. The political value of a small, rural constituency is pointed out in A. CHAMPAGNE,




Courts of Appeals and Incumbent Defeats in 1980, 1982, or 1984
Incumbents Defeated No Incumbents Defeated
# and Party2
of The Defeated
Court # Primary Seat' Incumbents Court # Primary Seat
I Houston 3 R; 1 D 6 Texarkana
2 Ft. Worth 2 R 7 Amarillo
3 Austin 1 R 8 El Paso
4 San Antonio 2 R 9 Beaumont
5 Dallas 4 D 11 Eastland
10 Waco 1 R 12 Tyler
14 Houston 3 R 13 Corpus Christi
TOTAL: 12 R; 5 D
1Primary Seat is the most common location in which the court hears cases.
2R= Republican Party Affiliation of Defeated Judge; D= Democratic Party Affiliation of
Defeated Judge.
Sources: Texas Secretary of State; Texas Office of Court Administration.
A judge can use the office to influence voters by calling larger than neces-
sary numbers of citizens for jury duty and then being lenient in granting
excuses and dismissing the unnecessary jurors. Such a practice allows the
judge to meet large numbers of voters, speak to them, and often earn their
gratitude by excusing them from duty.
When there are small numbers of voters in a judicial district, contact with
the electorate is a relatively easy task. Some judicial districts in Texas have
small voting populations. For example, in Cherokee County 8,182 people
voted in the 1980 election for one district judge who was an incumbent. In
Rusk County 7,198 people voted for an incumbent in an uncontested race.
In Corvell County 6,454 voted for an incumbent in an uncontested race, and
4,225 people voted in the district that includes Baylor, Cottle, King, and
Knox Counties. In 1984 in Medina, Real, and Uvalde Counties, in a con-
tested race with an incumbent, less than 17,000 votes were cast, and in Bor-
den and Scurry Counties, in a contested race without an incumbent, less
than 7,000 votes were cast.
On the other hand, in the urban, highly mobile environments of Dallas
and Harris counties, judges have an impossible task in contacting even a
majority of voters over a term in office. In 1980, for example, in an uncon-
tested Harris County district court race with an incumbent, over 185,000
people voted. In an uncontested criminal district court race in Dallas
County, over 220,000 people voted for the incumbent. In contested elections
in Dallas and Harris County, votes of 400,000 to 700,000 are common. A
few races in Harris County in 1984 had over 760,000 votes cast. In urban
areas, a judge, even one with long tenure, can easily be an unknown to a
large, mobile voting population. Judicial anonymity is enhanced by the
sheer number of judicial candidates on the ballot in urban areas.
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In 1982, for example, a Harris County voter would have faced a ballot
that contained three Supreme Court races, three Court of Criminal Appeals
races, twelve courts of appeals races, thirty-seven district court races, four
county civil court at law races, ten county criminal court races, and three
county probate court races. Voters would have also faced precinct level
justice of the peace races. Of the county level courts or higher, one Supreme
Court race and one Court of Criminal Appeals race was contested. There
were eight contested courts of appeals races and seventeen contested district
court races. At the county court level, two contested elections were for
county civil court at law and five for county criminal court.
In 1984 in Dallas County, voters faced three State Supreme Court elec-
tions, one of which was contested; three Court of Criminal Appeals elec-
tions, one of which was contested; four contested courts of appeals elections;
and eight contested district court elections.
The informed Harris County voter who in 1982 wished to vote in all judi-
cial elections from county-level to state-wide courts would have had to know
106 judicial candidates. That number excludes candidates in the party
primaries and only includes candidates in the general election. The in-
formed Dallas County voter in 1984 who wished to vote only in contested
judicial races during the general election would have had to know 28 candi-
dates. Faced with such a number of choices and limited knowledge of
judges, it should not be surprising that political party affiliation is often the
determining factor in elections.
6 Party Switching and Texas Judges. The transformation of Texas into a
two-party state has affected the party affiliations of judges. From 1980
through July 24, 1985, according to the Texas Republican Party, thirteen
district and appellate judges changed from the Democratic to the Republi-
can Party; eleven county court judges switched; and five justices of the peace
changed parties. 63
The Republican Party list shows that every party switch on an appellate
court was in the Fifth District, which primarily serves Dallas County. Every
party switch of a county court judge was in Dallas County. Along with
party switching by district court judges in Dallas County, a district court
judge in Denton County switched to the Republican Party. There were jus-
tices of the peace who switched parties in Bexar, Brazoria, Rockwell,
Neuces, and Taylor counties. Dallas County, however, has been the core
county for party switching by judges. Perhaps that pattern in Dallas is ex-
plained by the county's recent voting patterns. In 1984 Republicans won all
eight of the contested judicial races, defeating five Democratic incumbents.
Judge Don Koons, who switched to the Republican Party in early 1985,
described his reasons for switching: "I ran as a Democrat in 1982," he said.
"It was a long, tough year, but we won. On the other hand, it cost a lot
more money and time away from the bench to run as a Democrat. The work
63. Republican Party of Texas, Texas Switcher's List as of July 24, 1985 (mimeographed
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suffers some, and you've got to be always hustling money." 64
The early 1985 party switches included three of the judges rated most
highly in the Dallas bar's judicial evaluation. 65 However, with heavy Re-
publican voting in Dallas County and very heavy straight party Republican
voting, survival as a judge probably means survival as a Republican judge.
When District Judge Richard Mays switched in August 1985, he described
the political realities: "My political philosophy about general things has
nothing to do with me [sic] being a judge. That's not the reason I'm switch-
ing parties. The reason I'm switching is that to be a judge in Dallas County
you need to be a Republican."'66 As of early February 1985, 58 of the 69
judges in Dallas County were Republicans. With the switch of Richard
Mays in August 1985, 32 of the 36 district judges in Dallas County were
Republicans. Interestingly, Dallas County had no Republican judges before
1978.67
Party switching among the judiciary has occurred where there has been
rapid growth of the Republican Party into an overwhelmingly dominant
party. That kind of growth has occurred in Dallas County.68 In at least one
case, however, a Republican judicial candidate ventured onto stronger Dem-
ocratic political terrain and met with failure as a Republican, but success
with a party switch to the Democratic label. That candidate was Jim Brady,
who was elected in 1982 to the twenty-four county court of appeals that has
Austin as its primary seat. He was elected as a Democrat with no Republi-
can opposition. In 1980 Brady ran as a Republican for the Texas Supreme
Court and suffered a landslide defeat in those same twenty-four counties that
overwhelmingly supported him two years later.69
Low voter interest elections, such as judicial elections, force a reliance on
party labels in voting. For a judge to survive politically, it is necessary to be
affiliated with the party that receives the overwhelming majority of votes. If
judges are to be accountable to the electorate, such a reliance on party labels
may be proper, but that assumes that party affiliation is a proxy for compe-
tence as a judge or an indication of the policy positions of the judge.
7. The Future of Judicial Elections in Texas. It may be argued that the
political instability of the judiciary has been centered in Dallas and in Harris
counties. Most other counties in Texas have not had incumbent judges de-
feated. Rural counties in Texas have largely remained untouched by growth
64. Merida, 3 Judges Seem Set on Switch to the GOP, Dallas Morning News, Feb. 8, 1985,
at 25A, col. 5.
65. DALLAS BAR ASSOCIATION, RESULTS JUDICIAL EVALUATION POLL (Oct. 1983).
This evaluation gave a 90% overall performance rating to one of the three judges and 92%
ratings to the other two.
66. Brown, Democratic Judge Switches to GOP, Dallas Times Herald, Aug. 2, 1985, at
20A, col. 2.
67. Blow, supra note 53.
68. Barta, Heat on Democrats to Switch, Dallas Morning News, Feb. 11, 1985, at 19A, col.
3.
69. Garwood, Nonpartisan Election of Judges, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL
SOCIETY OF TEXAS 25, 29-30 (1983).
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of the Republican Party. Other than judicial districts within Dallas and
Harris counties and courts of appeals with primary seats in those counties,
there have been few general election races resulting in incumbent judges'
defeats. One can go further and argue that party competition outside of
Dallas and Harris counties is so rare that there are virtually no Republican
judges. Table 12 shows that all Republican courts of appeals judges are from
the courts of appeals based in Dallas and Harris County; 69% of Republican
district judges are from those two counties; and 80% of Republican county
level judges are from the two counties. The political party instability of the
judiciary in Dallas County, it can be argued, may well be on the verge of
slowing down. For the most part, Democratic judges have either been swept
out of office or changed their party affiliation. As a result, Dallas County,
one may argue, is approaching party stability within the judiciary as it ap-
proaches an all-Republican judiciary. Harris County is still intensely com-
petitive; thus, it could be argued that the major problem of political
instability within the judicial branch is now in the Houston area.
These arguments, however, overlook the likelihood that Democratic gov-
ernors will appoint Democrats to judicial vacancies in Dallas County, rekin-
dling the pattern of incumbent defeats in the next election. More
importantly, there are indications that the pattern of incumbent defeats first
experienced in Dallas and Harris Counties will spread. It goes well beyond
the data to claim that Texas is moving from being a one-party Democratic
state to being a one-party Republican state; however, there are strong indica-
tions that it is moving toward being a two-party state. The core of Republi-
can strength may be Dallas or Houston, but the Republican Party is rapidly
expanding. An examination of offices now held by Republicans reveals that
Texas has a Republican United States Senator and ten Republican United
States Congressmen, six of whom do not represent Dallas or Harris Coun-
ties. Texas has three Republican district attorneys, none of whom represents
Dallas or Harris Counties. There are six state senators who are Republi-
cans. Three of those state senators do not have districts in Dallas or Harris
Counties. There are 52 Republicans in the Texas House of Representatives,
and 32 of them do not represent Dallas or Harris Counties. If one looks at
county offices, there are 56 counties in Texas that have at least one Republi-
can officeholder at the precinct or county-wide level. 70 The core of Republi-
can strength may be Dallas and Houston; however, the Republican Party is
rapidly expanding all across the state.
The strongest indication of the growth of a two-party system in Texas is
probably the poll data in Table 13, which shows the increase in the number
of Texans who claim a Republican Party affiliation and, conversely, the de-
crease in number of Texans who claim a Democratic affiliation. In 1952
only 6% of Texans claimed a Republican affiliation, and only 14% did so in
1972. However, in 1985 33% of Texans claimed to be Republicans. In 1952
66% of Texans claimed to be Democrats, and in 1972 57% made that claim.






# of Republican # in Dallas County # in Harris County
Officeholders Area4  Area 5
Appeal Courts' 15 11 4
District Courts2  72 31 19
County Courts3  29 18 5
'Includes the Texas Supreme Court; Courts of Appeal; Court of Criminal Appeals.
2 District Courts; Criminal District.
3County Courts-At-Law; County Criminal Court; Probate Court; County Criminal Courts of
Appeal.
4 Dallas County Area = 5th Courts of Appeal.
5Harris County Area = 1st and 14th Courts of Appeal.
Source: REPUBLICAN PARTY OF TEXAS, OFFICIAL LEADERSHIP DIRECTORY (June 1, 1985).
Table 13
Texas Poll
The Growth of a Two Party Texas






1983- 1984 39% 23%
1985 34% 33%
Source: J. Dyer, D. Hill, A. Vedlitz, S. White, The Partisan Transformation of Texas, Paper
presented at the 1985 meetings of the American Political Science Association 3
(September 1, 1985).
In 1985 only 34% did so. Such data suggest that the pattern of incumbent
defeats in Dallas and Harris Counties can become a statewide pattern.
C. Summary
Though the Texas method of judicial selection is ostensibly elective, a ma-
jority of judges initially attain their positions through appointment. When
Texas was a one-party state, the only challenge that judges faced was the
Democratic party primary. The threat to the incumbent was a minimal one.
There have been no dramatic changes in the appointment process or the
Democratic party primary. In 1978, however, the Republican Party began
mounting numerous challenges in the general election. Also, in 1978 Wil-
liam Clements, a Republican, was elected governor, and thus the judicial
appointment power moved into Republican hands.
In 1980 the new pattern of general election challenges led to the defeat of
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14 incumbent district or appellate judges. In 1982, 23 judges were defeated.
In 1984, 16 judges were defeated. The partisan affiliation of the defeated
judges was a reflection of the top of the ticket vote in all three election years.
This suggests that the coattail of Ronald Reagan in 1980, of Lloyd Bentsen,
Mark White, and William Hobby in 1982, and of Ronald Reagan in 1984
had a dramatic effect on who won contested judicial elections. The pattern
associated with incumbent defeats was, as might be expected, particularly
evident in the state's two most populous counties, Dallas and Harris Coun-
ties. Incumbent judges were, in contrast, least likely to be defeated in the
most rural parts of the state.
The increase in the proportion of straight party voters has also had a
strong effect on judicial election outcomes. As the disparity in the percent-
age of straight party voters increases, it becomes more difficult for minority
party judicial candidates to win elections. In 1984, for example, a Demo-
cratic candidate for a judgeship in Dallas County would have had to get
60.6% of the independent vote to win. This figure ignores the fact suggested
by the Texas Poll that many of those "independent" voters actually leaned
toward the Republican Party.
The majority of district court and courts of appeals contested elections
have been separated by five percent of the vote or less. Such elections are
close enough to suggest that either candidate could reasonably have won the
election. It also suggests that judicial victories may often be determined by
no more than the year in which a candidate runs or the coattails of the
candidates at the top of the ticket.
The defeat of incumbent judges is not spread evenly throughout the state.
The state's most urban counties are the ones where successful judicial elec-
tion challenges to incumbents tend to be located. Those counties are also the
counties that have the most populous judicial districts with the largest
number of judicial candidates running for office. It is probably particularly
difficult for judges to develop ties with a majority of the voters in such dis-
tricts, making their positions in these districts tenuous.
Without ties to the electorate, it should not be surprising that voters in
urban areas place strong reliance upon the party affiliation of judicial candi-
dates. Judges who are members of the minority party in these districts must
switch parties to survive. Democratic judges switching to the Republican
Party has been most common in Dallas County because Dallas County has
been consistently Republican-leaning in recent years.
It seems likely that the Republican Party will continue to grow in Texas.
As it does, it appears that the competitiveness of judicial elections will in-
crease. As Texas moves toward becoming a viable two-party state, turnover
due to defeats in the regular election will increase.
A number of factors in the judicial selection process have been examined
in this section. A factor of special importance for judicial selection in Texas





A. Amounts Raised for Judicial Campaigns
According to campaign reports in the office of the Secretary of State, the
average contributions for all candidates for the Texas Supreme Court be-
tween 1982 and 1984 came to nearly $340,000.71 A donation of only a few
thousand dollars represents a substantial portion of the total amount likely
to be raised by a candidate. In recent years, candidates for the Texas
Supreme Court have received large campaign contributions. The largest
contributions have come from Clinton Manges, a South Texas rancher and
oil man. According to newspaper accounts, some of his contributions to
judicial candidates have amounted to $100,000 or more. One unsuccessful
Supreme Court candidate received $200,000 from Clinton Manges. This ac-
counted for over 90% of the candidate's contributions. A successful
Supreme Court candidate received about 33% of his total campaign contri-
butions from Mr. Manges. 72 Other donors have also made large contribu-
tions to judicial candidates. A survey of reports filed with the Secretary of
State shows some Supreme Court candidates received single donations of
$10,000 or more from a single donor. Several large donors are lawyers who
contributed to candidates in both 1982 and 1984, according to the Secretary
of State's office.
Some district and courts of appeals judges have received single contribu-
tions in the $10,000 to $15,000 range. The costly races are, of course, the
contested races. On the other hand, a rural Democratic district judge in
northeast Texas had no primary opponent and no election opponent. He
paid his own filing fee, accepted no campaign contributions, and had no
campaign expenditures. Similarly, a Republican judge in Collin County had
no primary or election opponent and received no contributions. A colleague
of that judge, also a Republican with no primary or election opponent, re-
ceived only one contribution greater than $50. Costly judicial campaigns are
not limited to contested partisan elections. 73 States like California, which
have commission selection and which hold retention elections, have been
experiencing increased judicial election costs. At least one of California's
retention elections at the Supreme Court level is likely in 1986 to go beyond
contribution levels for Texas Supreme Court races. 74
An examination of four Texas Supreme Court candidate contribution
71. See infra text Table 14.
72. Newspaper comments on these contributions include, Asker, '82 Supreme Court
Races Signal End of Era, Assert Winners, Losers, Houston Post, May 3, 1982, at 5D, col. 3;
Kilday, Judicial Race Donations Spark Callfor Reform, Dallas Times Herald, May 10, 1982,
at 3D, col 4.
73. For a discussion of national patterns in judicial campaign finance see Schotland, Elec-
tive Judges' Campaign Financing: Are State Judges' Robes the Emperor's Clothes of American
Democracy?, 2 J.L. & POL. 57 passim (1985).
74. Lindsey, California Leading Way in High-Cost Races for the Judiciary, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 19, 1985, at 6, col. 1. In 1978, California's Chief Justice Rose Bird spent $341,452 in her
retention election; $301,156 was spent opposing her retention. P. STOLZ, JUDGING JUDGES:
THE INVESTIGATION OF ROSE BIRD AND THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT 47 (1981).
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statements in the period from 1982 to 1984 indicates that no more than six
percent of single donations were for more than $2,000. Some of those large
contributions were multiple donations from the same donor, from a firm
associated with a large donor, or from a relative of a large donor. In three of
the four races, only three percent of the donations were for more than
$2,000. Although multiple small donations by one donor also occurred,
eighty-two percent to ninety-four percent of the single donations in the four
races were for $500 or less.
Table 14 shows the range of total contributions and average total cam-
paign contributions for candidates for the Texas Supreme Court. Table 15
shows the range of total contributions and average total contributions for
contested elections for the courts of appeals, Dallas County district courts,
and a small number of contested district court elections in counties other
than Dallas. Contested primaries with an uncontested election are not re-
ported in Table 15; however, campaign contribution reports in the Secretary
of State's office indicate that such races can sometimes be comparable in
total contributions to a contested election. In the 1982 Democratic primary,
for example, one court of appeals judge raised over $88,000, only to lose the
primary run-off to an opponent who raised nearly $30,000 and who spent
over $47,000.
As Table 15 notes, it is still possible to be elected in a contested election as
a district judge with total campaign contributions of less than $10,000.
However, the average total contributions to successful district judicial candi-
dates in Dallas County in 1982 was over $44,000. In '1984 it was nearly
$53,000. The small sample of "other" counties shows a great range in con-
tributions, with some 1982 races having relatively large total contributions
and the few 1984 races being low contribution races.
The average total campaign contributions in the "other" county category
was over $22,000 in 1982 and over $6,000 in 1984. Courts of appeals races
averaged over $30,000 in 1982 and over $43,000 in 1984. Winning candi-
dates' total contributions averaged over $34,000 in 1982 and over $28,000 in
1984.
The 1982-1984 average for all Supreme Court candidates in primaries and
in general elections was over $338,000; for winning candidates it was over
$570,000. It should be noted that the range of contributions in all races is
very great, even for a district judgeship within the same county. In Dallas
County for example, one Republican won with contributions of about
$2,300, another with contributions of about $200,000. Yet both defeated
Democratic incumbents.
There can be ethical questions for both lawyers and judges regarding con-
tributing and receiving campaign contributions from potential litigants and
lawyers. In some highly publicized cases, the receipt of large contributions
has led lawyers to try to disqualify judges from sitting in cases in which
contributors are involved. Attorneys for Texaco, for example, argued that
the first district judge assigned to the multi-billion dollar suit between Tex-
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received a $10,000 contribution from one of Pennzoil's lawyers. 75 Another
example of an effort to disqualify judges involved a case in which attorneys
argued before the Supreme Court that three justices should be disqualified
because they had received large contributions from the opposing party in the
case, Clinton Manges. 76 Press reports have claimed that one court of ap-
peals judge is under investigation for asking a district court judge to give a
continuance to a litigant who had contributed $10,000 to the court of ap-
peals judge.77 However, in Texas, receipt of campaign contributions from a
party in a case is not in itself grounds for disqualification of a judge.78 It is
possible for there to be an appearance of impropriety with judges receiving
contributions from lawyers and with lawyers contributing money to judicial
campaigns. However, taken by itself, receipt of campaign money is not
viewed as sufficient evidence of bias by a judge. Additionally, it is not con-
sidered unethical for lawyers to donate money to judicial campaigns.
It costs money-a lot of it-to run for statewide or urban offices in Texas.
Because Texas is a large state with great inflow of population, high mobility
in urban areas, a large number of media markets, and vast distances, the cost
of campaigning is necessarily high. To establish name identification in an
urban area or in a statewide race requires vast sums of money. Although
contributions for credible candidates are sizable, the state's size makes it
difficult for statewide judicial candidates to mount their campaigns. Con-
sider Texas Supreme Court races: candidates in these races receive roughly
the same range of contributions as recent Texas Congressional races. Con-
gressional candidates, however, run in an area that is about 1/27 the popula-
tion of the area in which a Texas Supreme Court justice must run.79
B. Who Gives and Why
Raising money for judicial races is not an easy job. Unlike a Congres-
sional position, a judgeship has low visibility. Few people other than law-
yers, potential litigants, and a few special interest groups with strong legal
interests are concerned enough with a judicial election to contribute money.
The need for money to reach voters is critical; however, the number of peo-
ple who are sufficiently interested in judicial elections to contribute money is
relatively small. In such cases, large donors are a necessity for the judicial
candidate. One illustration of the crucial role of large contributors is the
75. Norman, Why Texaco's Defense Didn't Play in Houston, Bus. WK. Dec. 23, 1985, at
28.
76. Motion for Recusal of Justice C.L. Ray, Manges v. Guerra, 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 430
(1983); Motion for Recusal of Justices Ted. Z. Robertson and William W. Kilgarlin, Manges v.
Guerra, 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 430 (1983).
77. Chamberlain, Resignation Denied Over Probe of San Antonio Appellate Judge, TEX.
LAW., Oct. 23, 1985, at 1.
78. E.g., Manges v. Guerra, 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 421, 424 (1984).
79. G. Robinson, supra note 61, at 23, notes that average spending by Texas Congres-
sional candidates in 1980 in primaries and general elections was $462,360. In 1982 the average
amount spent by Texas Congressional candidates was $517,818. Dubois has also noted that
compared to other elective offices, judicial campaigns are remarkably low cost. P. Dubois,




campaign contribution list of one justice who, from 1983 through 1984, re-
ceived $1,043,879 in contributions to his campaign. The list of campaign
contributors is 195 pages long. Yet, 76 contributors gave slightly over one-
half of the justice's campaign fund. Many of those 76 donors were related to
one another or were affiliated with the same law firm. Such a case suggests
that judicial candidates can be extremely dependent on contributions from a
very small number of people.
Although self-funding still occurs even in high level judicial races, it is
rare that a candidate can personally fund a campaign. Though the vast
majority of donations are under $500, large contributions are often necessary
to cover the costs of a serious race. It is ethically questionable for judges to
be so dependent on lawyers and litigants for their support. Judges or pro-
spective judicial candidates often feel uncomfortable about soliciting money
from persons who may appear in their courtrooms. Similarly, attorneys can
be intimidated by a request for funds from a judge.80 The appearance of
such funding is suspect, particularly in the eyes of those who are opposed to
the elective system. However, the real problem for judicial candidates is an
insufficient base of contributors."'
If one views the judicial selection process as one in which judges are to be
held accountable by voters, unsatisfactory judicial decisions can lead to pun-
ishment at the polls. A judge whose rulings are adverse to the interests of
litigants, to specific lawyers, or to certain segments of the bar can expect
those persons or groups to work against the judge's reelection. Hostile rul-
ings will lead to contributions designed to defeat the sitting judge. In one
Texas city, for example, after a court of appeals judge ruled against an attor-
ney and his clients in a $3,000,000 slander case, the attorney recruited and
financed a justice of the peace who proceeded to defeat the eighteen-year
judicial veteran. The attorney "agrees that ... judges now realize that he
will back politically what he believes in legally." The attorney stated, "I
think that message has gotten across pretty substantially . . . We have a
pretty good court now .... We seem to have their undivided attention. '8 2
Some efforts have been made to shape Texas law by electing judges who
are believed to be sympathetic to particular interests. This has occurred, in
particular, in Texas Supreme Court elections.83 There is a perception that
the Texas Supreme Court has wrought dramatic changes in tort law.84 Ac-
80. For a discussion of the ethics of judicial campaign finance see Schotland, supra note
73, at 90-96, 155-61.
81. That problem leads to a related problem: too little money available to mount viable
campaigns. The latter problem has been noted by id. at 95. On the effects that campaign
funding can have on the appearance of fairness see Kilday, Texas Justice Scolded, Dallas Times
Herald, Feb. 7, 1986, col. 6.
82. Fish, Flashy Lawyer Dabbles in Politics For Fun, Dallas Morning News, May 9, 1982,
1AA, col. 3.
83. J. May & N. Goldman, The Texas Supreme Court: Bar Politics as a Variable in Judi-
cial Decision Making and in Judicial Politics, Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the
Southern Political Science Association 1, 5-7 (Nov. 2, 1984).
84. Id. at 6; S. Stevens, supra note 55, at 14-15; Kilday, High Court Campaigns Targeted,
Dallas Times Herald, Oct. 27, 1985, IA, col. 1.
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cording to The University of Texas professors Janice May and Nathan
Goldman, those changes have been variously described as a victory for liber-
als against conservatives or as a victory for plaintiffs and plaintiffs' lawyers
against defense lawyers and business interests such as insurance
companies. 8
5
Lawyers who represent individual litigants in suits against insurance com-
panies are known as personal injury plaintiff's lawyers. Based on informa-
tion in the office of the Secretary of State, large donor plaintiffs' lawyers are
centered in San Antonio, Corpus Christi, and Houston. In each locale, they
have contributed $10,000, $20,000, or more to several candidates who are
alleged to be liberal or pro-plaintiff. Some analysts say that insurance de-
fense lawyers, or lawyers who represent insurance companies, have tended to
back candidates who are alleged to be conservative or pro-defense.
8 6
Since the contingent fee system allows lawyers to share in damage awards,
it is perceived by some to be an incentive for personal injury plaintiffs' law-
yers to back candidates whom they believe to be sympathetic to the expan-
sion of damage awards. On the other hand, although insurance defense
lawyers have contributed heavily to judicial campaigns, they lack that direct
financial stake in a candidate's success. 87 However, the business community,
particularly insurance companies and professionals, such as physicians, do
have a direct financial stake in damage awards. Recently, in response to
perceived electoral successes of the personal injury plaintiffs' bar, segments
of the business community and the medical profession have begun efforts to
support Supreme Court candidates who are less inclined to expand damage
awards than are some incumbents. The Texas Supreme Court Justice Com-
mittee, a statewide organization to oppose allegedly plaintiff-oriented jus-
tices, has recently been founded and reportedly has begun serious fund-
raising efforts.88
C. The Relationship Between Campaign Contributions
and Electoral Success
It is clear that money is a crucial part of judicial elections in Texas. Dur-
ing the 1982 and 1984 elections, records show that with the exception of
James Denton's Democratic Party primary victory, the best financed Texas
Supreme Court candidate consistently won office. One should be careful not
to overemphasize the importance of money, however, for it may not be the
cause of candidate victory. In fact, the perception that a candidate is a "win-
ner" may be the cause of the candidate receiving the most campaign money.
Although a certain amount is needed to be a viable candidate, factors other
than money are important for candidate success. 89
85. J. May & N. Goldman, supra note 83, at 5-7.
86. Id.; Schotland, supra note 73, at 61.
87. J. May & N. Goldman, supra note 83, at 6-7.
88. Kilday, supra note 84.
89. Schotland notes that in some states contributions clearly tend to go to winners since
donations are made after the election. Schotland, supra note 73, at 118 n. 159. That money is
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Additional factors that are associated with victory include campaign skills
of the candidate, incumbency of the candidate, and the candidate's name.
James Denton won the Democratic primary for the Texas Supreme Court
although he had less funding than his opponent. Denton, however, was an
incumbent and a hard campaigner. He had an opponent, William Kilgarlin,
who has the disadvantage of a name that was hard to pronounce.90
Political party affiliation is also a major factor that is associated with can-
didate success. John Bates, in 1984, received nearly 46% of the votes in his
race against John Hill even though Bates had roughly $12,000 in contribu-
tions in the 1983 to 1985 reporting period and Hill had over $1,400,000.
Additionally, Hill was a former attorney general and a former gubernatorial
candidate. Bates was not well known politically, but Bates was a Republican
in a Republican year in Texas.
Table 16 notes that at the court of appeals level, there is virtually no rela-
tionship between winning and the amount of money raised by the candidate.
Although there is a stronger relationship between winning and having the
most contributions in Dallas County, being a Republican or being an incum-
bent are also explanations for candidate success. A Republican Party affilia-
tion in Dallas County may be particularly important for a judicial
candidate's victory since Dallas is a strong Republican bastion. In such a
situation, a Republican affiliation can prove far more crucial for victory than
a large amount of campaign money.
D. Summary
Financial contributions are not the sole reason for the success of judicial
candidates. Financial contributions, however, are important enough in judi-
cial elections that interests within the electorate can use their power to fi-
nance campaigns to play a significant role in promoting judicial candidacies.
Political scientists believe that interest groups compete in politics. This com-
petition will lead to varying patterns of political victories and defeats for the
groups. It will also result in changing coalitions among those groups as
there is a continual struggle for power. Overall, the goal of that competition
is to win political victories that will achieve the interest groups' goals. Ordi-
narily, political scientists think that the process of competition among inter-
ests for elective offices is characteristic of the legislative process. Extending
this theory to the judiciary, one can assert that judicial elections involve a
struggle between competing interests in society. Among the primary actors
in that struggle would be competing factions of the bar.
Theoretically, elections allow knowledgeable voters to make informed
choices between competing interests. The next section will explore the ex-
tent to which judicial elections achieve this ideal.
only a factor, but not the factor, associated with candidate success is noted by Volcansek,
Money or Name? A Sectional Analysis of Judicial Elections, 8 JUST. Sys. J. 46 (1983).








With Highest % of Winning % of Winning
Contributions Candidates Who Candidates Who
Who Won Were Incumbents Were Republicans
Courts of 47% 16% 3  47%4
Appeals' (19) (19) (19)
Dallas 68% 52% 5  76%6
County (25) (25) (25)
Five Rural 40% 60% 7  20%8
Counties 2  (5) (5) (5)
I Two campaign reports were so illegible that two elections are excluded from the analysis.
2 The counties are: Cameron, Willacy; Wichita; Armstrong, Potter, Randall; Bowie, Cass;
Borden and Scurry.
3 Two judges were incumbents and had the highest contribution levels in their races.
4 Two judges were Republicans (incumbents) and had the highest contribution levels in their
races.
5 Eleven of the incumbents had the highest contribution levels in their races.
6 Twelve Republicans had the highest contribution levels in their races.
7 One incumbent had the highest contribution level in his race.
8 One Republican had the highest contribution level in his race.
Source: Calculated from data obtained from Texas Secretary of State and Texas Office of
Court Administration.
V. VOTING FOR JUDGES
If the public desires judges to be accountable to the electorate, then voters
must make a rational choice between candidates. This choice can be a judg-
ment on the qualifications or policy positions of judicial candidates. For
such a choice to be based on reason, voters must assess judicial candidates in
one of two ways: (1) voters must have personal knowledge or information
about the judicial candidates; or (2) voters must have some external cue
about the candidates that allows voters to choose without personal knowl-
edge about specific candidates. If voters do not have knowledge of candi-
dates or useful cues as to the candidates' qualifications or positions, they will
use other means by which they can make ballot choices. Voters will respond
to candidates' public relations techniques or rely on name identification or
the name attractiveness of candidates.
This section will first examine voter knowledge of judicial candidates and
then examine voter cues about candidates where there is no specific knowl-
edge of candidates. Finally, there will be a discussion of public relations
techniques and other means for making ballot choices, such as voting on the




Although the evidence on voter knowledge of judicial candidates is mixed,
most studies show a lack of knowledge by voters. Table 17 presents the
Table 17
Knowledge of Judicial Candidates in New York Elections
(1954)
Respondent Respondent Respondent Respondent
Remembered Judge Could Name Could Name Either Paid No
Albert Conway' Any Court One or More Attention to
Being Contested Judicial Candidate or
Candidates Just Voted
Voted For Party Label
New York 1% 20% 19%2 78%
Buffalo 0% 11% 30% 3  62%
Cayuga
County 1% 14% 4% 84%
'Endorsed by both parties and elected chief judge of the New York Court of Appeal, New
York's highest court.
2Three fourths of these respondents named Samuel S. Leibowitz, a prominent criminal
attorney.
3Five sixths named Casimir T. Partyka, a widely known Polish leader in a heavily Polish
community.
Source: Klots, The Selection of Judges and the Short Ballot, 38 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y. 134, 136
(1955); How Much Do Voters Know or Care About Judicial Candidates?, 38 J. AM.
JUD. SOC'Y. 141 (1955).
results of a poll taken in New York in 1954. Hardly anyone could recall the
name of the chief justice of New York's highest court, a respected jurist who
was endorsed by both the Democratic and Republican parties. In instances
in which voters could name candidates for whom they had voted, the candi-
dates were exceptionally visible personalities. However, recall of any judicial
candidate's name was unusual. Most voters admitted that they either did
not pay attention to judicial elections or simply voted party label. Another
study found that even when an intense campaign battle was being fought for
the Wisconsin Supreme Court in 1964-65, only 46% of the electorate knew
that judges were elected in Wisconsin; only 30% knew which of two candi-
dates was an incumbent; and only 9% could remember anything substantive
about the state Supreme Court election that was held a few months before
the survey. Only 15% of voters knew the political parties to which the can-
didates belonged. This low percentage may be due to the fact that Wiscon-
sin judicial elections are nonpartisan. 91
In Oregon, on the other hand, researchers found that those who actually
voted for judicial candidates were able to identify them. A large proportion
of Oregon voters could correctly identify at least one circuit court candidate.




All four judicial candidates were identified by 11% of the sample; 16%
could identify three candidates; 21% could identify two candidates; and
34% of voters identified one candidate. Only 5% of voters could identify
none correctly, and only 13% gave no answer.
The Oregon election was nonpartisan and off-year. Theoretically, such an
election should be one with little voter awareness of the candidates. How-
ever, it is useful to note that only 8% of the Oregon voters felt that they had
no information on judicial cafididates, whereas 58% felt that they did not
have enough information. Of the sample of voters, 32% felt that they had
enough information to vote, and 2% felt that they had more than enough
information to vote.
The Oregon Secretary of State distributes a candidate information book to
every voter in the state. This book is the primary source of information for
Oregon voters in judicial elections. Organizations in Texas, such as the
League of Women Voters, do make candidate information material available
on request by voters; however, every registered voter does not automatically
receive the information. If a state-funded candidate information book has
led to awareness of judicial candidates by Oregon voters, perhaps such a
resource would prove valuable to Texas voters.
The same researchers studied Washington judicial elections and had simi-
lar findings. Again, the state provided a voter information booklet, although
not in time for primary elections as Oregon did. Nevertheless, even with
Oregon's pre-primary voter information booklet, it should be noted that
64% of voters felt that they still had insufficient information.92
The only published study of voter knowledge about judicial elections in
Texas was done in Lubbock at four polling places during the 1976 election.
This study is not based on a sample that would make it comparable to con-
temporary Dallas and Harris Counties with their highly competitive, parti-
san judicial campaigns. It is a valuable study, however, in that it examines
the Texas experience with judicial elections in a less urban population center
where judicial campaigns are not yet highly competitive. Although one may
argue that the study was done before Texas judicial elections were partisan,
it is also the case that the study was done when one judicial election resulted
in far greater media coverage of judicial elections than is normally the case
even for partisan elections. This election involved the candidacy of Don
Yarbrough for the Texas Supreme Court. Only 14.5% of the sample could
recall the name of one candidate for the Texas Supreme Court or Court of
Criminal Appeals. The county and district court races were uncontested.
No scandal was associated with those races as was the case with the Yar-
brough race. Only 2.5% of the sample could name county candidates, and
only 4.9% could name district court candidates. In contrast, 43.7% of the
voters could recall one candidate in the United States Senate race, and over
50% could recall one in the United States House of Representatives race.
Don Yarbrough was pitted against two write-in candidates in the general
92. See Lovrich & Sheldon, Voters in Judicial Elections: An Attentive Public Or An Unin-
formed Electorate?, 9 JUST. Sys. J. 23 passim (1984); Sheldon & Lovrich, supra note 41.
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election. He had had a Democratic primary opponent who was the over-
whelming choice of the State Bar's preferential poll. Prior to or at the time
of his election, he was the target of at least fifteen law suits. Two weeks
before the general election, he was the subject of a disbarment suit, which
alleged law violations and professional misconduct. Media attention for this
race was very high. Nevertheless, 75.2% of the sample of voters were una-
ware of the Yarbrough controversy.
Interestingly, 55.8% of the Lubbock sample indicated that they had voted
in a judicial election or that they would vote when they entered the polling
place. Nearly 68% supported the election of judges, but 85.8% could not
recall the name of one judicial candidate. Oregon voters could identify judi-
cial candidates and felt that they had some knowledge of candidates. In
Texas, although knowledge of judicial candidates increased when voters re-
ceived information on candidates from legal sources, only 7.9% reported
receiving information from any legal source. 93
Most research supports the view that voters are uninformed about judicial
candidates. There is no direct evidence on voter knowledge of highly com-
petitive partisan elections in Texas. The conclusion that can be drawn from
the available evidence, however, is that judicial elections tend to have low
voter interest. 94
It may be that voters can make judgments about judicial candidates even
though they know little or nothing about the candidates. 95 The following
subsection examines this issue and, in particular, focuses on party affiliation
and ethnicity as cues that aid voter choices.
B. Cues About Judicial Voting Absent Information
About Specific Judicial Candidates
Two major cues that uninformed voters have in the voting booth are:
(1) the candidate's political party affiliation; and (2) the ethnicity of the can-
didate, which is suggested by the candidate's name. There are also several
other cues, such as place on the ballot, gender of the candidate, and the use
of nicknames on the ballot. It is possible that some of these cues allow an
uninformed voter to make a meaningful choice among candidates. Such a
choice can be a choice between judicial policies, or it can be a symbolic polit-
ical choice. If the choice is a symbolic political choice, the voter may decide
that the important decision is to place as many people of a certain party or
ethnicity or gender as possible on the bench. If such a symbolic political
choice is made by the voter, then party voting, ethnic voting, or gender vot-
ing become ends in themselves. 96 Often judges are appointed at least in part
due to party affiliation, ethnicity, or gender. When such appointments are
93. Johnson, Shaeffer & McKnight, The Salience of Judicial Candidates and Elections, 59
Soc. Sci. Q. 371 passim (1978).
94. Adamany & Dubois, supra note 38, at 775, have written, "Supreme Court contests
have low visibility and it is unlikely that voters know much about judicial candidates."
95. Id.




made, they often are symbolic political choices by governors or presidents
and are aimed at providing rewards to key groups. Thus, party affiliation,
ethnicity, or gender related appointments tend to reflect the same choices as
voters who choose judges for symbolic reasons. Some believe that it is valua-
ble for certain interests or groups to be represented on the bench regardless
of the judges' policy choices.97 However, it is usually argued that at least
party affiliation provides a cue to voters about the judicial policy choices that
judges will make.98
Several studies have correlated political party affiliation and judicial deci-
sion-making. Those studies have found differences between the judicial deci-
sions of Democratic and Republican judges. The relationship between
political party affiliations and judicial decisions on the Michigan Supreme
Court was examined by one scholar. He concentrated on workman's com-
pensation cases decided between 1958 and 1960 and found a pattern of Dem-
ocratic-Republican divisions in non-unanimous decisions. 99 However, the
Michigan Supreme Court was known for its partisan nature. 10 A similar
study of workman's compensation decisions by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court, a court with a far less partisan reputation than the Michigan court,
found that party affiliations of justices were less useful in explaining Wiscon-
sin's court decisions than was the case with the Michigan court.101 Addi-
tionally, there was a much higher degree of unanimity on the Wisconsin
Supreme Court than there was on the Michigan Supreme Court. Wiscon-
sin's proportion of cases that were not unanimous was only 12% compared
to 46% in Michigan. 102
All workman's compensation appeals decided by the New York Court of
Appeals from 1914 to 1967 were examined in one study. With the exception
of one twelve-year period, judges' party affiliations had only a slight relation-
ship to judges' decisions.' 0 3 One study of partisan divisions on five state
supreme courts found that 32 of the 47 Democratic justices voted for the
worker more than their court's average in workman's compensation cases.
Only 12 of 51 Republicans did so. However, the researcher cautioned that
other areas of law probably would not reflect as much of a partisan division.
It was also noted that the five courts studied were not representative of all
state surpeme courts.1°4
Another study examined the decisions of state supreme court justices who
97. See, e.g., the comments of President Carter and Senator Edward Kennedy in,
Slotnick, Reforms in Judicial Selection: Will They Affect the Senate's Role? (pt. 2), 64 JUDICA-
TURE 114, 115-16 (1980).
98. Adamany & Dubois, supra note 38, at 775.
99. Ulmer, The Political Party Variable in the Michigan Supreme Court, in JUDICIAL BE-
HAVIOR 279 passim (G. Schubert ed. 1964).
100. Stecher, Democratic and Republican Justice: Judicial Decision-Making on Five State
Supreme Courts, 13 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 137, 144 n.39.
101. Adamany, The Party Variable in Judges' Voting: Conceptual Notes and a Case Study,
63 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 72 passim (1969).
102. Stecher, supra note 100, at 145.
103. Beiser & Silbermann, The Political Party Variable: Workmen's Compensation in the
New York Court of Appeals, 3 POLITY 521 passim (1971).
104. Stecher, supra note 100, at 177-78.
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in 1955 sat on bipartisan courts. It was found that Democratic judges
tended to be more "liberal" than the average for their court, and Republican
judges tended to be more "conservative." There was a statistically signifi-
cant relationship between being a Democrat and: (1) tending to be for the
defense in criminal cases; (2) being for the administrative agency in business
regulation cases; (3) supporting the claimant in unemployment compensa-
tion cases; (4) favoring the defendant on claims of constitutional violations
in criminal cases; (5) supporting the government in tax cases; (6) being for
the tenant in landlord-tenant cases; (7) favoring the consumer in consumer
sales cases; (8) supporting the injured party in motor vehicle accident cases;
and (9) favoring the employee in workman's compensation cases. 10 5
Another study used statistical techniques to measure the extent of the va-
riance in judicial decision-making that was attributed to political party affili-
ation. In no category did political party explain more than 10% of the
variance in judicial decisions. 10 6 One survey of this research reported,
"Bowen, too, found that party affiliation was the most valuable item in ex-
plaining the differences among judges, but it was still not a powerful predic-
tor of votes. 'A final inescapable conclusion,' he wrote, 'about the
explanatory power of the sociological background characteristics of these
judges is that they are generally not very helpful.' "o107
In the early 1970s a re-examination of the 1955 data on state supreme
court justices was done. It was found that political party explained 7% of
the variance in judicial decisions in criminal cases and 14% of the variance
in economic cases. By statistically controlling for the effect of attitudes, or-
ganizational memberships, previous occupation of the judge, education, age,
and town in which the judge practiced, it was possible to increase the per-
centage of the variance of judicial decisions explained to 11% in criminal
cases and 44% in economic cases. 108 The 44% figure is a most impressive
one. Of course, voters are unable to control for the effects of other variables
when they cast their ballots. Instead, a voter with no cue to voting except
party would have to rely upon the uncontrolled relationship between party
affiliation and liberalism/conservatism in judicial decisions. Thus, a voter
relying on party alone could vote in such a way that only 7% of the variance
in judicial decisions in criminal cases and only 14% of the variance in eco-
nomic cases could be reduced.
Another statistical analysis was one of the relationship between political
party affiliation and the decisional behavior of judges on the federal courts of
appeals. Political party explained 9.2% of the variance in criminal proce-
dure cases; 13.3% of the variance in civil liberties cases; 17.7% of labor
decisions; 7% of private economic cases; .4% in cases relating to govern-
mental fiscal matters; 14.3% in cases involving injured persons; 9.9% of
105. Nagel, Political Party Affiliation and Judges' Decisions, 55 AM. POL. Scl. REV. 843
passim (1961).
106. D. Bowen, The Explanation of Judicial Voting Behavior from Sociological Character-
istics of Judges (1965) (unpublished dissertation in Yale University Library).
107. W. MURPHY & J. TANENHAUS, THE STUDY OF PUBLIC LAW 107 (1972).
108. S. NAGEL, supra note 45, at 244-45.
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political liberalism cases; 4.9% of judicial activism cases; and .4% of dissent
behavior. The article concluded, "These findings lend some slight encour-
agement to backgrounds-behavior research at the aggregate level." 10 9
Although these and other studies tend to find a statistically significant
relationship between political party and judicial decisions, most studies show
that the relationship is not strong. Democrats show a tendency to be more
"liberal" in their decisions than are Republicans; however, as a cue for vot-
ers, judges' party affiliations have limited value."10
Additionally, it should be noted that the studies of the relationship be-
tween political party affiliation and judicial voting behavior are not based on
Texas studies. The studies treat the Democratic Party as the liberal party
and the Republican Party as the conservative party. As Janice May and
Nathan Goldman have pointed out, although the Texas Republican Party
may be a conservative party, the Texas Democratic Party contains both lib-
eral and conservative factions. The result is that the ideological divisions
between the two parties in Texas is likely to be more blurred than it would
be in many of the states." ' I The Texas Poll asked Democrats and Republi-
cans to identify themselves as liberals or conservatives. Of the Democrats,
26% identified themselves as liberals; 30% called themselves conservatives;
and the remainder identified themselves as moderates. Only 12% of Repub-
licans identified themselves as liberals; 54% as conservatives; and the rest as
moderates. 12 If the ideology of judicial candidates is much like that of vot-
ers who express a party preference, party affiliation currently does not pro-
vide a good cue to Texas voters that Democratic judicial candidates are
liberal candidates. On the other hand, it does provide a fairly good cue that
Republican judicial candidates are conservative candidates. As Texas moves
more toward becoming a two-party state, perhaps the ideological differences
between the two parties may become more distinct, and the limited relation-
ship found between party affiliation and judicial decisions will be more appli-
cable to the state's judiciary.
As a cue, identifying the ethnicity of a candidate by a surname is at best
an uncertain effort. Very limited research has been done on the relationship
between the ethnicity of a judge, as determined by the surname, and the
judge's policy positions. One study, for example, used judges' names to di-
vide them into "Part non-British ancestry vs. only British" ancestry. Such a
division would be similar to a voter casting a ballot for or against a candidate
with an Anglo-Saxon name. Yet, it was found that there was only a .09
correlation between having part non-British ancestry and being a liberal in
109. Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United States Courts of Appeals Revisited, 69 AM.
POL. Sci. REV. 491 passim (1975) (emphasis added by author).
110. Correlations between party affiliations and judicial decisions tend to be low enough
that political party affiliations seem to be a poor predictor of judicial policy positions. In Texas
political party affiliations may be particularly poor cues to judicial policy positions. See J. May
& N. Goldman, supra note 83, at 1.
111. Id.
112. Dyer, Hill, Vedlitz & White, The Partisan Transformation of Texas, Paper Presented




judicial decisions in criminal justice cases. There was only a .01 correlation
between being part non-British ancestry and being a liberal in judicial deci-
sions in economic cases. 1t 3 These correlations are very low. It should be
noted that the studies to date of the relationship between minority ethnicity,
such as having an Hispanic surname, and judicial decisions are too limited to
be conclusive.
The gender of judicial candidates can sometimes be determined by the
judge's name. However, the number of women has been so limited that sta-
tistical studies relating gender to judicial behavior have been inconclusive."t 4
C. Issueless Campaigns and Public Relations Techniques
To attract votes, a judicial candidate in an urban area faces a difficult task.
Straight party voters usually cannot be totally excluded from a judicial cam-
paign effort. The candidate cannot distinguish the straight party voter from
the independent voter, except to exclude voting precincts that contain many
straight party voters from such things as campaign mailings." 5 Somehow,
the candidate must attract those independent voters.
Judicial candidates are hindered far more than other candidates for office.
Unlike a candidate for the legislative and executive branches, the judicial
candidate cannot ethically discuss issues that may come before his or her
court. Instead, the candidate must rely on some vague claim of being the
"best qualified." Proof of qualifications is usually doubtful at best: years of
judicial experience or legal experience; law school from which the candidate
graduated; family status; veteran status; organizational memberships; news-
paper and interest group endorsements; and perhaps bar poll or evaluation
ratings are usually the extent of a judicial candidate's efforts to inform the
public. If any differences among candidates can be identified, it will be in the
bar poll; however, now all judicial districts in Texas have a bar poll. Even
with that poll, it is unclear how the poll should be interpreted. It is possible
that the poll is little more than a popularity rating by lawyers. There are a
few Texas bar associations with judicial evaluations; however, the non-in-
cumbent candidate is probably not evaluated since he is probably not yet a
judge. If the poll or evaluation does reflect poorly on the candidate, that
person can always campaign as the opponent of the establishment bar or
argue that as "one of the people" the candidate is being persecuted by the
establishment.116
There are exceptions to issueless judicial campaigns in Texas. In 1980 one
113. S. NAGEL, supra note 45, at 245.
114. In 1970 only one percent of the American judiciary was female; in 1979 only four
percent of judges were women. See Slotnick, Gender, Affirmative Action, and Recruitment to
the Federal Bench, 14 GOLDEN GATE 519, 524 (1984). In an overview of research on differ-
ences in decision-making by white male judges compared to black or to female judges, Slotnick
states: "At bottom, the literature on non-traditional judges has been quite exploratory, limited
in scope, and somewhat inconclusive." Slotnick, The Paths to the Federal Bench: Gender,
Race and Judicial Recruitment Variation, 67 JUDICATURE 370, 374 (1984).
115. McGonigle, Name Recognition at the Heart of Judge Candidates' Game Plan, Dallas
Morning News, Nov. 3, 1984, at 34A, col. 3.
116. E.g., Henderson & Sinclair, supra note 14, at 450. For a contemporary example of
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candidate for a Houston area court of appeals seat, for example, campaigned
in favor of school prayer, lower taxes, individual rights, and non-interference
of government in private matters. He also spoke out against pornography,
abortion on demand, and unjust legal technicalities.' 17 Recent races for the
Texas Supreme Court have placed stress on the wealth of one justice,1 18 the
"... little regard for the average person" of another justice, 1 9 and the al-
leged plaintiff or defense bias of several candidates and incumbent
justices. 120
Far more common in these issueless campaigns are vague statements that
have little to do with the judge's position or statements that are open to a
number of interpretations. One candidate for a court of appeals position, for
example, had an advertisement claiming that he was "A judge who will sup-
port not hinder law enforcement[;a] judge deeply concerned about child
abuse and the horde of unpaid child support orders[; and a] judge opposed to
liberal interpretation who will read the law as it was written."' 2 1
Judges can sometimes attract the attention of voters with public relations
techniques. One successful judicial candidate in 1978 campaigned in a used
fire truck. 122 Often slogans or appeals designed to catch the public eye can
work. One successful judicial candidate campaigned against a black female
incumbent judge by running advertisements that referred to her as the "af-
firmative action" candidate.123 Another candidate ran with the motto: "Ex-
perience, Quality and Availability." He noted his years of experience on the
bench and his opponent's youth, funding, and lack of trial experience. He
added that he was a deacon in his church, a Sunday School teacher, an ac-
tive worker in the Boy Scouts, a Silver Beaver award winner, and a World
War II veteran. He also claimed active involvement in Veterans of Foreign
Wars, the American Legion, and Disabled Veterans. 124 Another district
court candidate's advertisement not only noted the judicial candidate's legal
experience, but contained the slogan: "Independent thinking people want
their independent rights preserved."' 125 The right combination of imagery is
crucial to a candidate who is in a campaign in which public interest is low
and discussion of issues raises ethical problems.
D. Names and Name Identification
Another way that candidates try to appeal to voters is through name iden-
tification. Some candidates are blessed with politically appealing names,
such as Judge Sam Houston Clinton, Judge Ira Sam Houston, Judge John
such an argument, see McGonigle, Vaughan Fares Best, Howell Worst in Judge Ratings, Dallas
Morning News, Dec. 7, 1985, at 35A, col. 1.
117. S. Stevens, supra note 55, at 10.
118. Id. at 11.
119. Id. at 10.
120. J. May & N. Goldman, supra note 83, at 6-7.
121. Dallas Times Herald, Nov. 3, 1984, at 8C, col. 4.
122. Blow, supra note 53.
123. Calhoun, Howell-Storey Race, Dallas Times Herald, Oct. 15, 1984, at 10A, col. 3.
124. Dallas Times Herald, Nov. 4, 1984, at 4E, col. 4.
125. Dallas Times Herald, Nov. 4, 1984, at 4E, col. 1.
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Marshall, or Judge Sam Bass. If one is not born with an attractive name, it
can somethimes be created by listing a nickname on the ballot and running
as "Bill" instead of "William," "Bob" instead of "Robert," or "Joe" instead
of "Joseph." In California primary voting for Democratic and Republican
Party leaders, it was found that candidates with nicknames on the ballot had
a 79% advantage over candidates without nicknames.1 26
Some judges have established name identification with the voters by hav-
ing held previous offices, such as Justice Price Daniel or Chief Justice John
Hill. Others can rely on being the namesake of famous Texas political
figures, such as Judge Martin Dies. Still others benefit from having a name
that is similar to another well known person or institution. Chief Justice Joe
Greenhill believed that he gained votes in Dallas because of the well-known
Greenhill School even though he has no relationship to the school. Simi-
larly, he believed that the candidacy of a person named Greenwood in the
Houston area gained Greenhill votes that were intended for Greenwood. 127
Chief Justice Robert Calvert felt that there were two major reasons for his
victory in his earliest Supreme Court races: (1) that his name was almost
identical to Comptroller Robert Calvert, a long-time Texas officeholder
whose name appeared on all state warrants; and (2) that Calvert's Whiskey
advertising campaigns included newspaper advertising that said "Switch to
Calvert."128
The judge in Dallas County with the highest name recognition is Ron
Chapman, also the name of a popular local radio personality. 129 Perhaps the
most famous instance of voter name confusion was the successful effort of
Don Yarbrough to win a seat on the Texas Supreme Court. His name was
apparently confused with the well-known gubernatorial candidate Don Yar-
brough, or possibly with the long-time Texas senator, Ralph Yarborough.
The result was that Don Yarbrough defeated a respected judge even though
Yarbrough was the subject of numerous lawsuits and a disbarment
proceeding. 130
At times a name can create political difficulties for a judge. It was widely
believed that Judge Charles Dally's name was a political liability since voters
would identify the name with judicial delay.' 3' When Dallas County Crimi-
nal Court Judge Tom Price decided to run for a judgeship in 1974, one of the
reasons that he chose to oppose Judge Carl Friedlander was because the
judge's name was a difficult one. 132 Similarly, one of the state's most
respected judges, St. John Garwood, was nearly defeated by a candidate
126. Byrne & Pueschel, But Who Should I Vote For For Coroner?, 36 J. POL. 778, 783
(1974).
127. Interview with Justice Joe Greenhill, in Austin, Texas (Oct. 16, 1985).
128. S. Stevens, supra note 55, at 6.
129. McGonigle, supra note 115.
130. An excellent treatment of the Don Yarbrough case is Holder, That's Yarbrough-
Spelled with one "0"; A Study of Judicial Misbehavior in Texas, in PRACTICING TEXAS POLI-
TICS 447 (E. Jones, J. Ericson, L. Brown & R. Trotter eds. 1980).
131. E.g., Judicial Election Just a "Crapshoot," Austin American-Statesman, May 9, 1982,
at C2, col. 1.
132. McGonigle, supra note 115.
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whose name, Jefferson Smith, was more folksy and who had developed name
identification with voters by his frequent tries for office. St. John Garwood,
on the other hand, almost was defeated because of his aristocratic sounding
name. 133 William Kilgarlin believed that having an unusual name hurt him
in his Supreme Court race against James Denton.'3 4
Judicial names can also be important in establishing the ethnic identity of
voters who, with little other information about the candidate, will vote for or
against the ethnic group reperesented by the name. A study of primary vot-
ing for party leaders in California found that in those low voter knowledge
races, a Scandinavian name offers a 24% political advantage over all other
names, an English name a 3% advantage, a Spanish name an 11% disadvan-
tage, a Jewish name a 14% disadvantage, and an Italian name a 39% disad-
vantage.135 The distribution of advantages and disadvantages would likely
be different in Texas, but the study does show that ethnicity of one's sur-
name can be a powerful determinant of political success or failure.
At times a candidate can participate in a case with sufficient news poten-
tial to affect voters, though such cases are probably rare. To get voters to
remember a name may require a candidate to plaster an area with yard signs,
bill boards, bumper stickers, and television and radio commercials. A jingle
is often useful to create name recall among voters. Rarely do these adver-
tisements provide much information other than a name and office. The hope
is that voters will remember the name and vote for the candidate.
With only general and often subjective information on qualifications, little
or no information on a candidate's issue positions, and only limited informa-
tion on candidates such as name identification, it should not be surprising
that party affiliation is often a major cue to voters in judicial elections. Even
if there is an effort to inform voters, limited funds make it difficult to pro-
mote a serious voter education campaign. Emphasis on name identification
and party identification becomes necessary because of costs associated with
more sophisticated efforts. The lack of a serious voter education campaign is
suggested by the Dallas County experience, where a judicial candidate is
considered to have run a substantial informational campaign if mailings are
sent to 100 of the county's 411 voting precincts. 136
133. St. John Garwood described this race as follows: "This writer had the interesting
experience, in one of his elections following his appointment to the Supreme Court, of losing
over two-thirds of the state's 254 counties to a retired school teacher with a law license who
was not even listed as a lawyer in his local telephone directory. He had probably never tried a
contested case above justice court level, but he had previously (but unsuccessfully) run for the
offices of State Superintendent of Public Instruction and Railroad Commissioner and he had
an appealing name. Except for the writer's home base being Houston, he would have served
perhaps the shortest Supreme Court term in Texas history." Garwood, Judicial Revision-An
Argument for the Merit Plan for Judicial Selection and Tenure, 5 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1, 14
(1973).
134. Asker, supra note 72.
135. Byrne & Pueschel, supra note 126, at 782.
136. McGonigle, supra note 115.
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E. Possible Other Cues
The party primary offers even less information to the voter than the regu-
lar election since all candidates in the primary have the same party affilia-
tion. A study of 500 party central committee elections for the Democratic
and Republican parties in California between 1948 and 1970 suggests that
there are several important determinants of successful campaigns for obscure
offices. The study is not directly comparable to Texas judicial offices since
party offices may possibly be more obscure than judicial offices. Addition-
ally, the occupation of candidates can be listed on the California ballot for
party offices; however, an occupational listing would be, for the most part,
irrelevant for judicial offices since most judicial candidates would be lawyers.
Even so, the study offers some excellent insights into how people vote in low
interest elections absent party affiliation listings. In this way, it is somewhat
similar to primary elections for judges in Texas.
The study found that certain occupational listings gave candidates an ad-
vantage over other listings or over non-listings of occupations. Although
most of these occupational listings are irrelevant to this research, one occu-
pational listing is "incumbent." That listing gives candidates a 47% advan-
tage over those without the "incumbent" listing. It has been suggested that
Texas judges be identified as incumbents on the election ballot. If this is
done, it would have an impact on election results. At least judges on courts
with relatively uncontroversial duties will likely have an electoral advantage.
In elections without partisan labels, the advantage would likely be great.
However, it may be that some courts, such as the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals, perform duties unpopular enough that the "incumbent" label could
be an electoral disadvantage for the judge.
Contrary to extensive earlier research, the California study found that first
place on the ballot does not give candidates an electoral advantage. How-
ever, where there are several candidates, those below the first place on the
ballot, but not at the bottom or near bottom places on the ballot, are likely to
suffer some disadvantage. The importance of ethnicity of surnames and of
the use of nicknames was noted earlier. Additionally, male candidates were
found to have an 8% political advantage over female candidates. 37
F. Summary
Available evidence suggests that voter knowledge of judicial candidates
tends to be low. Additionally, party affiliations of judicial candidates and
the ethnicity of those candidates are limited substitutes for specific knowl-
edge about judicial elections. In low interest elections, votes based on public
relations techniques, name attractiveness, and name identification became
substitutes for voter policy choices.
This section has suggested that it is unlikely that voters know much about
137. Byrne & Pueschel, supra note 126, at 778 passim. The major study that did find that
the first place on the ballot provided an electoral advantage is H. BAIN & D. HECOCK, BALLOT
POSITION AND VOTER'S CHOICE (1957).
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candidates' policy choices. Additionally, given limited knowledge of judicial
candidates, it is unlikely that voters can make judgments about the quality
or competence of judicial candidates. The next section more fully explores
the problems associated with an evaluation of the quality of judges. It also
explores the major means through which voters receive evaluations of judi-
cial quality.
VI. THE QUALITY OF JUDGES
A. Judicial Quality A Subjective Concept
The measurement of judicial quality is an exceedingly difficult and subjec-
tive process. The result is that there is no widely accepted measure of qual-
ity that is applied to state judges. 138 Using subjective ratings by the Missouri
bar, Table 18 shows that the bar gave fewer low overall ratings to Missouri
plan judges than they did to elective judges. If faith can be placed in these
subjective ratings of judges by members of the bar, elective judges have a far
greater range in quality than Missouri plan judges. The very limited data
suggest that the Missouri plan eliminates the poorest quality judges, but it
does not produce the highest quality judges. 13 9
TABLE 18
LAWYER RANKINGS OF JUDGES IN MISSOURI
Highest Quartile Ranking Lowest Quartile Ranking
Statewide St. Louis County Statewide St. Louis County
Commission
Selected 23% 21% 10% 0%
Judges (31) (14) (31) (14)
Elective 34% 33% 26% 22%
Judges (53) (18) (53) (18)
Source: R. WATSON & R. DOWNING, THE POLITICS OF THE BENCH AND BAR 283-284
(1969).
When efforts have been made to quantify notions of judicial "quality" in
order to compare the effects of the various systems of judicial selection, more
precise indices of quality have been so doubtful that they seem of little use.
Some differences have been found between elective judges and commission
selected judges in terms of whether the judges selected were born within the
state; whether they received a legal education within the state; and whether
they had prior political experience. 140 The extent to which these three back-
ground characteristics relate to quality, however, is open to debate. One
study showed that most of the differences in the characteristics of judges
were related to region of the country as opposed to the system of selection.
For example, although it is true that partisan election produces dramatically
138. P. DuBols, supra note 37, at 13-17.
139. See supra text Table 18.
140. See Jacob, The Effect of Institutional Differences in the Recruitment Process: The Case
of State Judges, 13 J. PuB. L. 104 passim (1964).
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more Democratic than Republican judges, it is because partisan election
states are concentrated in the South, which has traditionally been a Demo-
cratic region.' 4 1
It has been shown that there were virtually no differences in the age, birth-
place, education, political experience, or prior judicial service of judges in
Missouri who were rated by lawyers as "superior" compared to judges rated
as "inferior". 142 The result is that "[t]he qualifications and qualities essen-
tial to a 'good' judge are vague and uncertain; needless to say, choosing the
'best qualified' individuals to sit on the judiciary is a problematic
endeavor." 14 3
B. A Representative Judiciary
Some persons will consider a judiciary that is representative of the popula-
tion to be one aspect of a quality judiciary. Thus, one important question
relating to the characteristics of judges is: which method of judicial selection
results in a bench that is most representative of the population?
In overwhelming numbers, America's trial judges tend to be white
males. ' That nationwide pattern is also the pattern in Texas. Only one
Hispanic has served on the Texas Supreme Court. Since Reconstruction no
blacks have served. 145 One black male was elected in 1984 to a district court
position in Dallas County. There were newspaper reports that his victory
was due to his Republican affiliation and voter ignorance of his race.146 In
1980 a black female was appointed to a district court position, but was de-
feated in her first election bid by a Republican opponent who labeled her the
"affirmative action candidate."' 147 Some reports suggest that the state's one
Hispanic justice, appointed to his position by Governor White, may have
election difficulties because of his Hispanic surname. 148 Nevertheless, Texas
minorities can now be elected to judgeships. 149 Several judges with Hispanic
surnames, for example, have been elected in South Texas in recent elections.
Some research suggests that there is a relationship between judicial selec-
tion method and opportunities for minorities to become judges. For exam-
ple, one study noted that 97.8% of the commissioners in commission
selection systems were white. That statistic supports the charge that the
commissions are not representative of society-at-large and may not be able to
141. Canon, The Impact of Formal Selection Processes on the Characteristics of Judges, 6 L.
Soc'Y REV. 579 passim (1972).
142. R. WATSON & R. DOWNING, supra note 29, at 302-04.
143. P. DUBOIS, supra note 37, at 17.
144. J. RYAN, A. ASHMAN, B. SALES & S. SHANE-DUBOW, AMERICAN TRIAL JUDGES:
THEIR WORK STYLES AND PERFORMANCE 128 (1980).
145. Attlesey, Hispanic Justice to Face Challenge in Primary, Dallas Morning News, Nov.
13, 1985, at 24A, col. 1; Merida, Color Barrier Still Prevalent in Politics, Analysts Say, Dallas
Morning News, Feb. 2, 1986, at IA, col. 1.
146. Tatum, Politics and Justice, Dallas Morning News, Nov. 9, 1984, at 20A, col. 3.
147. Calhoun, supra note 123.
148. S. Stevens, supra note 55, at 6-7.
149. The percentage of blacks elected to any offices in Texas, however, has so far been low.
Although 11% of the state's population is black, 1.1% of Texas' 24,757 elected officials are
black. See Merida, supra note 145.
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produce a representative judiciary.'50
Evidence is far from conclusive, however, that one system of selection will
necessarily lead to less minority representation in the judiciary than will an-
other system. Although there may be localities where one system has been
successful in producing a representative judiciary, no system is clearly the
most successful overall in recruiting blacks and women. One survey of the
18 black judges who served on state or District of Columbia appellate
benches in 1977 found that 6 served in partisan election states; 3 served in
nonpartisan election states; 5 in commission selection states; and 4 served in
the District of Columbia where judges are appointed. A 1973 survey of 167
black judges found that 37% were elected; 33% appointed; and 30% were
initially appointed to a vacancy and then elected. Illinois, New York, and
Pennsylvania are responsible for about 40% of all black trial judges. Each of
these states is a partisan election state; however, it is not known whether
these black judges tended to be elected initially or to be appointed to
vacancies. 151
With respect to the selection of female judges, the results are also incon-
clusive. In 1977 there were 9 women serving on state courts of last resort.
Of those 9 women, 5 were chosen in states with elective systems; 3 in states
with appointive systems; and 1 in a Missouri plan state. Of the 21 women
who were then serving on intermediate appellate courts, 10 served in states
with elective systems; 7 served in states (or the District of Columbia) where
judges are appointed; and 4 served in Missouri plan states. 152
Another study compared elected judges with those appointed to the Cali-
fornia Superior Court from 1959 to 1977. The elected judges were elected on
nonpartisan ballots; appointed judges were selected to fill mid-term vacan-
cies. Elected judges were only slightly more likely to be female and non-
white than were appointed judges. Of the elected judges, 6.7% were female
and 9.1% were nonwhite; 2.7% of the appointed judges were female and
3.7% were nonwhite. As the author of the study noted, "The differences
between the two methods are obviously not large, however, and the limited
access of women and ethnic minorities to the judiciary seems to be more a
function of the homogeneous composition of the legal profession than the
mode of judicial selection." 53
C. American Bar Association Efforts
The American Bar Association does try to determine if judicial nominees
for federal courts are qualified, but some would say that effort is too subjec-
150. Dunn, Judicial Election and the Missouri Plan, in COURTS, LAW, AND JUDICIAL
PROCESSES 105, 109 (S. Ulmer ed. 1981).
151. Flango & Ducat, supra note 11, at 30.
152. Id.
153. Dubois, The Influence of Selection System on the Characteristics of a Trial Court
Bench: The Case of California, 8 JUST. SYS. J. 59, 63-65 (1983). One survey of the literature
which examined the various types of judicial selection systems concluded that neither sex nor




tive and biased in favor of the established bar.15 4 It also applies only to
judicial nominees, and no attempt is made to continue those evaluations at
other points in the judges' careers. The process attempts to evaluate judicial
candidates' maturity, competence, experience, integrity, and ability to per-
form judicial duties.
There is a statistical relationship between low ABA ratings and each of
the following: activity in a political party, legislative experience, and execu-
tive branch experience. Lack of trial experience, lack of judicial experience,
and lack of publication of books or articles also correlate with low ABA
ratings.' 55 One scholar has noted that "the most relevant practicing lawyer
experience is trial work.. ." and that "an even more relevant form of experi-
ence from the point of view of technical competence might be prior judicial
experience."' 156 Texas judges at the district court level and higher do tend to
obtain judicial experience in low level courts.1 57
Caution must be exercised, however, in claiming that prior judicial experi-
ence is a necessary or sufficient measure of quality. It was previously noted
that in Missouri there was no relationship between bar ratings of judges and
the judges' prior judicial service. One of the lowest rated district court
judges in Dallas County bar polls and judicial evaluations had over twenty
years of judicial experience. Additionally, one study which examined the
characteristics of U.S. Supreme Court justices found that only 12% of jus-
tices with judicial experience were considered "great," but 41% of justices
without judicial experience were ranked as "great."'' 5 8 When 100 federal
district judges were ranked and given an "ability score" based on the per-
centage of cases that were appealed, the percentage of appeals that resulted
in reversals, and the percentage of cases that were reversed, it was found that
65% of the above average "ability score" judges had no prior judicial experi-
ence, but only 43% of those judges with prior judicial experience had above
average "ability scores."1 59
Claims of experience, competence, maturity, ability, and, most impor-
tantly, integrity must be evaluated if there are to be meaningful grounds
upon which judicial selection is made. In some states those evaluation ef-
forts are made by judicial selection commissions. In Texas the assumption
has been that the evaluations could be made by voters, although the voters'
evaluation efforts might be aided by endorsements from media and interest
154. H. ABRAHAM, supra note 13, at 27.
155. S. NAGEL, supra note 45, at 226-27.
156. Id. at 228.
157. Henderson and Sinclair note that 48.9% of the appellate judges in their study moved
directly to their posts from district judgeships. A total of 57.8% of appellate judges had at one
time been district judges. Of the district judges, 10.2% had been county court at law judges
and 14.7% had been county judges (in Texas, county judges are largely administrative posi-
tions with some judicial responsibilities). See Henderson & Sinclair, supra note 14, at 489-90.
As of March 1984, 58% of appellate judges originally came to their courts from lower courts.
Of the 364 district and criminal district judges, 28% had at one time served as a judge on a
lower court. Calculated from, 1983 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 10.
158. S. NAGEL, supra note 45, at 193.
159. Id. at 195.
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groups. The objectivity of media and interest group endorsements, however,
is open to question. The endorsements can reflect the biases of the media or
group rather than being a judgment upon the competence of a judicial candi-
date.160 Some voters do rely upon such endorsements. A Roper poll of the
1954 New York judicial election found that 21% of the voters relied on
newspaper recommendations. Only the party affiliation of the candidate got
a higher response with 39% of the voters relying on party affiliation in their
voting. 161
In Texas bar polls have long been prized by judicial candidates as a mea-
sure of competence that can be presented to voters.' 62 More recently, non-
partisan citizen committees on judicial qualifications and judicial evaluations
reflect efforts to provide additional measures of judicial quality. Because of
the importance of committees on judicial qualifications, judicial evaluations,
and bar polls, the remainder of this section will be devoted to examining
these quality assessing devices.
D. Committees For A Qualified Judiciary
Within Texas the Committee for a Qualified Judiciary in Dallas County
has sihice 1982 evaluated the qualifications of judicial candidates for state-
wide office, the court of appeals that serves Dallas County and vicinity, and
Dallas County judicial offices. It is based on the American Bar Association
model for evaluating federal judicial nominees. A similar effort in Harris
County began in 1984. These committees are composed of lawyers and lay
people. They are nonpartisan and exist solely to evaluate judicial candidates.
Similar committees exist in other states and have operated with varying
success. All of these efforts are in response to a perceived need to provide
voters with information on judicial candidates that may aid them in casting
informed votes.' 6 3
In 1982 the Dallas Committee appears to have experienced some success
in electing candidates that it endorsed. Only one of its endorsed candidates,
a Democrat, was defeated by an unendorsed opponent. There were fourteen
district court races in which the Committee made a single endorsement of a
candidate. Of its seven Democratic endorsements, six won, although all of
those six candidates were incumbents.
The Committee's success in 1984 is more open to doubt. The Committee
endorsed two Democrats on the Fifth Court of Appeals, but did not endorse
the Republican opponent. The two Democrats lost. The Committee also
endorsed two criminal district court judges who were Democrats, and both
were defeated. It was only the Committee's Republican endorsements who
were successful.
160. Henderson and Sinclair, however, suggest a tendency for newspapers to ally them-
selves with the bar associations. See Henderson & Sinclair, supra note 14, at 449.
161. S. NAGEL, supra note 45, at 215.
162. Henderson & Sinclair, supra note 14, at 450. Volcansek considers bar poll ratings
important as a voting cue in judicial elections in Dade County, Florida. Volcansek, An Expla-
nation of the Judicial Election Process, 34 W. POL. Q. 572, 575-76 (1981).
163. Schotland, supra note 73, at 96-104.
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The Harris County committee began endorsing candidates in 1984. In
Harris County the judicial qualifications committee issued eleven singular
endorsements of candidates for the First and Fourteenth Courts of Appeals
and Harris County District Courts. In three district court races the endorse-
ments were not exclusive, but instead both Democratic and Republican can-
didates were determined to be qualified. Of the eleven exclusive committee
endorsements, only four candidates won. Those four were the committee's
only Republican endorsements. The seven Democrats who were endorsed
included six incumbents, and all were defeated in the Reagan landslide.
The Dallas and Harris County committees do not provide an explanation
of why a candidate is "qualified" or not, nor do they rank one candidate as
more qualified than another when two candidates are endorsed for the same
office. As a result, only limited information is provided to voters. At least
one Republican judicial candidate in Dallas County has accused the Com-
mittee of having a Democratic bias.'6 Thus, it seems possible to campaign
against the Committee should a candidate fail to win its endorsement.
E. Bar Polls
Most of the larger bar associations in Texas publish bar polls. Results of
these polls are often used by judicial candidates in their advertising. 165
Those who lose bar polls, however, will either ignore the results in their
advertising or campaign as a candidate "of the people" rather than as a can-
didate "of the legal establishment."1 66
Houston's 1982 preference poll, with one exception, endorsed every in-
cumbent running for office in courts of appeals races and district court races.
The one incumbent not preferred by the bar lost, but 11 of 19 incumbents
preferred by the bar were defeated. Where no incumbents were involved, the
bar poll's preferences were more successful. In only one of five races was the
poll's choice defeated; however, that choice was the poll's only Republican
choice. Not all bar preference polls are such poor predictors of the behavior
of the electorate. The 1982 Dallas Bar Association poll could have been
used to predict accurately 17 of 18 courts of appeals and district court races
in the Dallas area. Every one of the 12 incumbents was preferred in the
Dallas poll.
Although bar polls may be useful for campaign purposes and may be re-
lied upon to a degree by voters, it is unclear what bar polls mean. It may be
argued that attorneys have insufficient information to rank judges or that the
ballots are not cast solely on judgments of judicial competency. Rather than
providing a measure of the quality of judges, they seem to be bar popularity
polls that often exhibit a strong bias toward incumbents. 167
164. See the judicial candidate's advertisement in the Dallas Morning News, Nov. 1, 1982,
at 11A, col. 3.
165. See, e.g., the judicial candidate's advertisement in the Dallas Times Herald, Nov. 4,
1984, at 7E, col. 4.
166. Henderson & Sinclair, supra note 14, at 450.




Some bar associations have attempted to evaluate the performance of
judges by asking lawyers who claim personal knowledge to score the judges
along such dimensions as: proper application of the law; courtesy and atten-
tiveness; impartiality; efficient use of attorney's time; and diligence. It may
be argued that such evaluations place great trust in the objectivity of the
attorneys evaluating the judges. Yet, with the possible exception of the two
committees in Dallas and Harris Counties, in Texas there is no more widely
available effort to provide voters with an evaluation of qualifications of
judges. The League of Women Voter's guides provide facts, but not evalua-
tions. These evaluations by the bar may be criticized in that only sitting
judges' qualifications are evaluated. Unless an open election attracts the
candidacies of sitting judges, or unless the opponent of an incumbent is a
sitting judge, only partial information on a judicial race is provided to voters.
The extent to which voters rely on judicial evaluations is doubtful. Table
19 divided judicial evaluations in Harris and Dallas counties into three cate-
Table 19
Judicial Evaluations' and Election Victory in Dallas and Harris Counties
(1982-1984)
# of Judges # of Judges # of Judges
with score with score with score
of 85-100 of 70-84 Below 70
Won Election 8 4 4




re-election 66% 50% 50%
11981 Houston evaluation score is the overall rating score for the judge; 1983 Houston
evaluation score is the average of nine evaluation questions; 1981 and 1983 Dallas evaluation
score is the average of five evaluation questions.
Source: Dallas and Harris County Bar Association Judicial Evaluations for 1981 and 1983.
gories: high, medium, and low categories. It was then determined whether
there was a relationship between a judge's evaluation score and victory in the
election following the evaluation. High scoring judges won re-election 66%
of the time; however, 50% of medium and low scoring judges also won re-
election. On two occasions, two sitting judges were competing in the same
races. In one of those races, a low scoring judge ran against a high scoring
judge; the low scoring judge won the election. In the other case, a medium
scoring judge ran against a high scoring judge; the medium scoring judge
won.
G. Summary
At best, efforts to determine the quality of judges are subjective processes.
[Vol. 40
SELECTION IN TEXAS
Judicial qualifications committees, bar polls, and judicial evaluations are all
subject to criticisms. Of these three major efforts, bar polls do not even ex-
plicitly assess the quality of judges. Based on the results of the elections,
none of these efforts can claim much success in influencing Texas voters in
recent elections.
VII. ACCOUNTABILITY VS. INDEPENDENCE
The diversity of systems of judicial selection reflects the uncertainty and
ambiguity that society feels over the role of judges within the political pro-
cess. Figure 3 suggests that the four major systems of judicial selection fit
Figure 3
The Major Systems of Judicial Selection and Their Goals
The Goal of Electoral The Goal of Electoral
Accountability Independence




Partisan Election Selection Appointment
Election of Judges
of Judges
along a continuum that ranges from judicial accountability, where judges are
directly responsible to voters through the election process, to judicial inde-
pendence from the voting process. The partisan election system, such as is
found in Texas, theoretically prefers electoral accountability over indepen-
dence from the electorate; a purely appointive system, on the other hand,
opts for independence over accountability. Nonpartisan election attempts to
retain the value of voter accountability while trying to remove judicial elec-
tions from the partisanship that is typically found in the electoral process.'
Commission selection plans stress independence, but make some effort to
insure electorial accountability through retention elections.
The key to the debate over judicial selection lies in the priority given to
these core values of accountability and independence. The literature on judi-
cial selection is clear that there is no proof that one system will produce the
"best" judges.168 The literature is also clear that no system will remove
political judgments from the selection of judges, although the arenas in
which those political judgments are exercised will be different as will the
decision makers.
Although one of the arguments in favor of commission selection is that
the commission system will produce the "best" judges, empirical support for
this claim is lacking. It may be that research has overemphasized Missouri
as the state in which commission selection is studied. Other commission
selection states may provide better examples of the effect of the Missouri
plan. Yet, even if the state of Missouri is not the best example of the plan in
168. But see R. WATSON & R. DOWNING, supra note 29, at 283-84.
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operation, the failures of commission selection in Missouri to produce a
nonpolitical selection system and to produce the "best" judges suggest that
the selection system alone does not produce a quality judiciary. The key to
the success of any system of selection may be the interaction between the
system of selection and the political culture of the state. As an extreme ex-
ample of this point, no selection system in Huey Long's Lousiana would
have produced a judiciary that was apolitical and selected solely on the basis
of professional qualifications. The interaction between selection system and
political culture is a fluid one because states continually change. Thus, a
system of selection may perform well in securing first-rate judges at one time
and fail in that effort at a later time.
Perhaps it is unfortunate that the best and most detailed study of commis-
sion selection is based on Missouri. Arguably, it may be a study of one of
the worst examples of the plan; however, other research in general confirms
the Missouri findings that partisan criteria play a major role even with com-
mission selection of judges. 169
One of the fundamental problems in determining which plan produces the
"best" judges is that there is no readily measurable definition of what the
"best" judges are. When commissioners in 15 commission selection jurisdic-
tions were asked to identify those characteristics that are important in judi-
cial selection, the 52 responses dealt mostly with "vague notions that the
commissioners generally try to apply to candidates" rather than "practical,
workable measures which can meaningfully differentiate among judicial
nominees." 17 0
Qualities desired in judges tend to deal with temperament, neutrality, and
ability. However, as one scholar noted in reference to these generally highly
subjective criteria, ". . . these general standards or qualifications are practi-
cally unverifiable since they are nearly impossible to translate into measura-
ble or distinguishable evaluations that can accurately screen potential
nominees."171
Rather than deal with vague concepts like temperament, intellectual abil-
ity, or courtesy, social scientists tend to rely on readily available and easily
quantifiable information on judges like birthplace, education, political back-
ground, and judicial experience. As previously noted, whether these judicial
characteristics measure the quality of judges is open to debate. More impor-
tantly, the findings do not show that one selection system produces judges
with significantly different or superior background characteristics than other
selection systems. As one scholar has noted:
None of these differences [in background characteristics] is very great
but it is most important that the variations which are presented do not
follow a recruitment system pattern. We might draw two conclusions
from this research. First, the Missouri Plan does not consistently pro-
169. See the summary in Glick, The Promise and the Performance of the Missouri Plan:
Judicial Selection in the Fifty States, 32 U. MIAMI L. REV. 520, 521 (1978).
170. Id. at 520-21.
171. Id. at 523.
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duce obviously superior judges in terms of quality education, cosmopol-
itan backgrounds, previous judicial experience or non-partisan careers.
Indeed, not only are the judges not decidely [sic] superior in this regard,
but they often appear indistinguishable from the others. Second, the
studies suggest that regional, cultural, or individual state factors are
more important in explaining who become judges. 172
Of course, because differences in the quality of judges under the various sys-
tems of selection have not been found does not mean that differences do not
exist. It may be that the characteristics of good judges are simply too diffi-
cult to define clearly or measure adequately. For the present, however, it
does not seem fruitful to argue that changes in the Texas system of selection
will necessarily produce better judges or that changes will de-politicize the
judiciary.
It may prove more useful to examine judicial selection from a perspective
other than one that stresses the relationship between judicial selection sys-
tem and judicial quality. An alternative perspective, one frequently dis-
cussed in the literature on judicial selection, stresses two key questions:
(1) to what extent does partisan election of judges in Texas achieve the goal
of an electorally accountable judiciary? and, (2) should electoral accounta-
bility actually be the primary goal in selecting judges?173
Keeping in mind that judicial accountability requires that the people have
information upon which a choice among judicial candidates can be made,
what currently are the characteristics of judicial selection in Texas? Those
characteristics, also summarized in Table 20 along with suggestions for im-
provements and alternatives to the system, include the following. First, fre-
quent challenges are being made to incumbents. Defeats of incumbents are
occurring. Voter decisions are often based on party affiliation, ethnicity, and
name identification, none of which seems likely to be related to judicial com-
petence. Second, lengthy ballots exist in urban areas. This leads to an in-
creasing number of voter choices in elections that are of low interest to
voters. Third, election outcomes are often dependent on coattail and
straight party voting, although party affiliation is only mildly related to judi-
cial deicisional behavior. Fourth, expensive judicial campaigns exist. The
contributor base of judicial campaigns is narrow. Such a pattern of cam-
paign finance can create reliance on large donors for campaign funding. Yet,
even with expensive campaigns and large donations, judicial campaign trea-
suries can rarely support widespread voter education efforts. Finally, there
are inadequate or ineffectual mechanisms to inform voters regarding judicial
candidates.
Choices involving the extent to which judges should be subject to the elec-
toral process are value judgments. This paper can only point out that parti-
san election as it currently operates in Texas is not achieving its goal of
172. Id. at 527.
173. Among the scholars who have used the concepts of accountability and independence
in order to evaluate judicial selection systems are P. DUBsIS, supra note 37; S. NAGEL, supra
note 45; Adamany & Dubois, supra note 38; Ladinsky & Silver, supra note 91; Lovrich &
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electoral accountability. Voters lack sufficient information to make the in-
formed decisions that are needed to make choices among judicial candidates.
Some may conclude that the failure to achieve electoral accountability
should lead not simply to efforts to reform the partisan election system, but
to a complete reconsideration of the goals desired from a system of judicial
selection. If independence from the electoral process is then chosen over
accountability, one of the other alternatives to the current system of judicial
selection should be adopted. If independence from the electoral process is
the only goal desired, appointment should be adopted. If greater indepen-
dence from the electoral process is desired without totally abandoning the
electoral accountability goal, then commission selection or nonpartisan elec-
tion should be adopted.
If the choice is to move toward independence from the electoral process as
the goal of the Texas judicial system, several points can be drawn from the
literature. These points may be useful in designing an alternative system of
judicial selection.
First, the basic problem of an appointive system of judicial selection is the
limited check on the appointing power. If a chief executive has a good rela-
tionship with key senators, it can be nearly impossible to prevent the ap-
pointment of even the weakest judge. An executive can make judicial
appointments to reward friends or to develop a political agenda and that
executive can give little attention to any considerations of judicial quality.
Depending on the character and concerns of the executive, the appointive
system can create a superb or a disappointing judiciary. 74
Second, nonpartisan elections that are truly independent of political par-
ties (and not all nonpartisan elections are) may leave voters with no cues
with which judges can be selected. If the costs of judicial campaigns are of
concern to voters, nonpartisan elections may prove even more expensive
since the absence of party labels will require more money to reach voters
than under a partisan election system. Nonpartisan elections may require
state funding of judicial campaigns. Indeed, the fundamental problem with
nonpartisan election is that it can leave voters in an information vacuum
regarding judicial candidates. This may lead to uninformed balloting or
even the domination of nonpartisan elections by well organized special inter-
est groups.' 75 Efforts need to be made to ensure that the voters' needs for
information about judicial candidates are met, perhaps, through such things
as voter information packets furnished by the state.
Third, commission selection has three problems: (1) the representative-
ness of the commission; (2) the manipulation of the commission; and (3) the
manipulation of the retention election. In reference to the representativeness
174. As Henry Abraham notes, Presidential appointments to the Supreme Court have been
based on: (i) merit; (2) friendship; (3) representation of interests; and (4) ideology. Presidents
weigh these concerns in different ways. See H. ABRAHAM, supra note 14, at 54-63.
175. Dubois notes that voters in nonpartisan judicial elections are left with little informa-
tion upon which to make a voting decision. In such circumstances, many voters choose not to
vote. See P. Duaois, supra note 37, at 93. Low information-low participation elections seem
fertile ground for domination by special interest groups.
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of the commission, the major study of the Missouri plan found that the de-
fense bar tended to dominate appellate level judicial selection commissions.
This domination was not so great that there was evidence of a defense bias
among judges; indeed, persons with strong plaintiff or defense orientations
tended to be excluded from consideration for judgeships. However, an im-
portant segment of the bar was inadequately represented on the commis-
sions. Structurally, Texas might consider designing commission
membership to ensure adequate representation of the diverse interests within
the bar.
The commission has also been subject to manipulation by governors and
possibly judicial members. Although few would deny the executive's or the
judiciary's interest in being represented on the commission, gubernatorial or
judicial domination of the commission destroys its independent role. The
structure of the commission might be designed to ensure against executive or
judicial domination. 176
Finally, the retention election can become a tool of special interests to
defeat incumbent judges in what is typically the type of judicial election that
has the lowest voter turnout. Retention elections can also be very expensive
so that campaign finance can prove to be as troublesome for judges as it is in
partisan elections. 177 The value of the retention election needs to be care-
fully weighed against the risks that it poses for campaign finance ethics, ma-
nipulation by special interests, and its effect upon judicial independence.
In conclusion, this research has focused on the patterns of judicial selec-
tion in Texas. Clearly, the patterns are in response to changes in the electo-
rate. Demographics play a role as population shifts to urban areas;
technology plays a role as we have increased access to instant media commu-
nication; expectations play a role as the voters determine what they desire
from the judiciary.
Judicial selection is a mirror image of our goals for the system of justice
that we expect. To be sure, the subject is a complex one-one that is difficult
to document and even more difficult to develop for public dialogue due to
the emotionally charged atmosphere surrounding it. However, the purpose
of this research has been: (1) to examine past and present judicial selection
in Texas; (2) to provide empirical data; and (3) to explore some of the major
alternative systems of judicial selection. It is hoped that the research and
analysis will provide a basis of information upon which individuals can make
informed decisions as to the most productive and effective method of judicial
selection for our state. It is up to the public to determine which system fits
Texas.
176. R. WATSON & R. DOWNING, supra note 29, at 107-11, 331-32, 334-45; Wenske, Dis-
sension Rocks Missouri Justices, National Law Journal, May 27, 1985, at 1, col. 3.
177. See Schotland, supra note 73, at 59-60. But see P. Dubois, supra note 79, which sug-
gests that, at least at the trial court level in California, campaign finance is not as serious a
problem as Schotland suggests.
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SOME SUGGESTIONS BY THE AUTHOR REGARDING ACCOUNTABILITY
It may be that society accepts the goal of accountability for judges without
recognizing its meaning like the voters in the study in Lubbock who did not
know anything about the judges for whom they were voting, but liked the
idea of voting for them.178 If one accepts the idea of partisan election, how-
ever, one must also accept the idea that judges are a part of the political
process. Such a belief is a legitimate one; however, it must be recognized
that in accepting it there is an implicit rejection of the Hamiltonian notion
that the judiciary should be independent of the electoral process.
If the choice is to achieve an electorally accountable judiciary, several
things seem to the author to be useful to an effort to move toward that goal.
First, judicial candidates have to be free to discuss judicial issues. Voters
should not be expected to choose their judges without having information
about candidates' judicial philosophies.
Second, evaluations of judicial candidates need to be more broadly based.
The Committee for a Qualified Judiciary might be a model to be applied on a
statewide basis. Ideally, such evaluations would provide information to vot-
ers that would aid them in making an informed choice. The evaluating or-
ganization might even elaborate upon its reasons for recommending
candidates in order to expand the knowledge base for voters. Unfortunately,
costs of such a statewide effort may be prohibitive.
Third, the state should provide information about candidates to voters. It
is worth noting that in both Oregon and Washington, the Secretary of State
sends information on all candidates to every registered voter in the state.
That information is relied upon by voters in casting judicial ballots, and vot-
ers in those two states are far more knowledgeable about judicial elections
than has been typically found in other states.' 79
Fourth, the long ballot and large number of contested judicial races dis-
courage informed voter decision making. Though gerrymandering of judi-
cial districts is a real danger, dramatic redefinitions of judicial boundaries to
smaller units and a reduction in the number of judges voted upon by urban
voters are required. One voter with over eighty judicial votes, as now occurs
in Harris County, is numerically the equivalent of the voter casting ballots
for all of the Texas Senate and nearly one-third of the Texas House!
Finally, if there are concerns over campaign finance, restrictions on dona-
tions would have to be coupled with state funding for judicial campaigns in
order to inform voters adequately. Many of these suggestions may seem radi-
cal or expensive or both. Yet all of these efforts would aid the people in
making informed choices among judicial candidates. It may be that these
efforts to inform voters about judges will not work in huge landslide elec-
tions such as Reagan's 1984 victory, but these efforts can at least enhance
the voters' opportunities to make informed choices.
178. Johnson, Shaeffer & McKnight, supra note 93, at 376.
179. Sheldon & Lovrich, supra note 41, at 235 passim.
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